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Abstract
Brownfields are abandoned or underused land whose redevelopment is complicated by
the presence or perception of contamination. Nationally the United States Environmental
Protection Agency estimates the number of brownfields to be more than half a million.
As of 2002, the EPA requires states and tribal governments to inventory brownfields
within their boundaries in order to receive federal funding for brownfield response
programs; municipalities and regional planning offices eligible for competitive EPA
brownfield grants are encouraged to first conduct a brownfield inventory. Assessment
grants funding inventories are open-ended, allowing local governments to define their
own methods of identifying brownfields and prioritizing parcels for redevelopment; as
such there is little documentation of the way inventories are conducted. Through
interviews with brownfield redevelopment professionals and inventory makers in
Alabama, California, Kentucky, Massachusetts and New Jersey this thesis explores the
ways local governments prioritize property types for identification, how they locate
brownfields, how they incorporate community knowledge, and how inventories influence
subsequent public funding allocations.
This research indicates that inventories tend to focus on large sites close to infrastructure
with the intention of marketing individual properties rather than strategically
incorporating brownfield redevelopment into broader urban or regional planning. While
local governments frequently design inventories in partnership with and for use by non-
government actors, they tend to work almost exclusively with other professional groups
and have marginal success at soliciting community participation. Though inventories are
meant to capture brownfields that have eluded regulatory databases of contaminant
release reports, fear of litigation from injured property owners and reliance on official
property records bias inventory results to represent only the most visible brownfields. I
conclude that the EPA should work with planning professionals to educate inventory
makers on ways of creating strategic inventories. I also assert that brownfield inventories
must include community partnerships in order to align brownfield redevelopment with
community objectives and explore the legal and political implications of such
partnerships.
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The Industrial Void
Warren, Ohio is a Rust Belt town dreaming of its Steel Belt past. About an hour
from Cleveland and a little more from Pittsburgh, Warren enjoyed a post-War prosperity
that financed middle-class homes with inlaid Travertine marble and mahogany banisters.
Today just beyond those elegant middle-class homes the tawny and jade retention ponds
of the Copperweld Steel facility curve with the narrow bends of the Mahoning River.
Rust streaks the metal cladding of the Copperweld building's many additions, memories
of its days as a Fortune 500 company. The 250-acre colossus is just one of many fallow
industrial properties in Trumbull County. Since massive layoffs of skilled workers started
in the late seventies, Warren's population has declined precipitously. Rusted phantasms
of its former life haunt the streets, reminders of an extinguished vitality and impediments
to even a modest recovery. Shuttering an industrial facility is cheaper than deconstructing
it, and since 1980 hanging onto a property tainted with industrial chemicals can be much
cheaper than selling it.
In 1980 Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), legislation which assigns complete liability
for the cleanup of a contaminated property to any former owner or operator of that
property. An industrial tenant responsible for one ton of contamination on a property
contaminated with thirty tons of chemicals can be compelled to pay for cleanup of all
thirty tons. That tenant can also be subject to tort liability for third party injuries-in the
case of Copperweld Steel adjacent households whose well water has been contaminated
with chemical runoff from the plant could sue for damages in civil court. But regulatory
and civil actions depend on soil and water tests, tests which are not required of non-
operating industrial facilities unless the property is being considered for sale. So as long
as a property does not change ownership those regulatory and punitive costs can be
avoided. Of course the Copperweld property may not be contaminated; no contaminant
releases are listed on the Ohio Department of Environmental Protection website. But the
possibility of contamination may contribute to perception of the property as a high-risk
investment, one that may lead to costs far in excess of purchase price. Vacant or
underused properties plagued by the perception or real presence of contamination are
called brownfields, a phenomenon recognized by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) a full decade after the passage of CERCLA.
Since 1994 the EPA has provided more than $130 million for the assessment and
cleanup of brownfields (EPA New England 2006). Many of those assessment grants
funded brownfield inventories by states, municipalities, regional planning commissions
or tribal governments. The EPA encourages local governments interested in redeveloping
brownfields to begin with an inventory in order to strategically direct public funding for
environmental assessments and cleanup. State and tribal governments are required to
undertake a timely brownfield inventory under a 2002 amendment to CERCLA and are
provided federal funding to meet that obligation. However, the few guidelines attached to
federal funding for brownfield inventories give states and municipalities substantial
discretion in designing their inventories. Because local governments are not required to
report their processes for inventorying brownfields or the outcome of inventories beyond
the three-year period of a typical grant, the EPA has little information on how grant
recipients identify brownfields, how they prioritize brownfields to receive public funding
or how effective inventories are in catalyzing brownfield redevelopment.
In theory inventories matter because they influence how public funding will be
spent in the future-not just federal funds, but precious state and local funds in the form
of grants, loans and contaminated properties assumed by eminent domain or tax takings.
Theoretically inventories are the first time policymakers look systematically at
brownfield stock and therefore influence how they develop brownfield redevelopment
incentives and project review processes. For example, if brownfields are prioritized by
their marketability it is unlikely the inventory will position small neighborhood
brownfields for redevelopment. Additionally the participants in brownfield inventories
likely shape which brownfields are identified, what characteristics of a brownfield are
perceived as essential for making redevelopment decisions, and what incentives and
processes policymakers institute to facilitate redevelopment. Therefore the beneficiaries
of brownfield redevelopment are likely to be selected at the earliest stages of brownfield
response programs.
This thesis examines how local governments have performed brownfield
inventories, including who participates in inventory design, what sources they use to
identify brownfields or verify prior uses, what shape inventories take in terms of content
and accessibility and the political, economic and social implications of these inventories.
My case studies are constructed from conversations with inventory makers in places with
a variety of brownfield redevelopment experience, and include the Kenton County Land
Recycling Program sponsored by the Northern Kentucky Area Planning Commission,
Renew Alabama: An Alabama Redevelopment Database originated by the Regional
Planning Commission of Greater Birmingham and the New Jersey Site Mart developed
by the New Jersey Brownfields Redevelopment Task Force. Whenever possible I spoke
with the people who had initiated the inventory as well as the staff responsible for
continued maintenance. To contextualize the experiences and beliefs of inventory makers
I also spoke with the Brownfields Program Section Chief of EPA New England, a
developer in Northern California who specializes in the redevelopment of
environmentally-impaired properties throughout the country, and the former Assistant
Commissioner of the Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup at the Department of Environmental
Protection in Massachusetts.
Through these conversations I found that very often brownfield inventories do not
support the most efficient or socially equitable expenditure of public funds. Across the
board inventories command more resources than anticipated, often without enabling
strategic decision making. The common belief that brownfield redevelopment will be
market driven leads local governments to design inventories for use by real estate
developers even though it appears inventories infrequently facilitate market deals without
public intervention. Communities, frequently perceived as irrelevant or damaging to the
credibility of inventories, have no room to participate until development deals are under
negotiation. As environmentally-impaired properties in socially and economically
impaired places, brownfields must be assessed by all of their attributes and by all
stakeholders. Through this thesis I address the needs and modes for integrating
brownfields into participatory plans aimed at reviving places and people.
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Brownfields*
*But Were Afraid to Ask
The boom and bust of American industry can be mapped by the vacant industrial
lands in our most vibrant and stagnant places. While regulatory schemes and private
sector innovation have addressed many of the legal and engineering challenges of
brownfield redevelopment, economic and social obstacles persist.
The Birth of Brownfields: Industrial Waste, Superfund and Liability
Contaminated land has existed for as long as humans have modified their
environment. Mining and metallurgy left their traces among human habitation as far back
as the ages of bronze and iron. But the Industrial Revolution catalyzed resource
consumption and environmental modification at an unprecedented scale, with
commensurate impact on human health. Cities choked with smoke, pastures gave way to
factories, and in the coal-rich regions of Pennsylvania and Appalachia, whole cities
sprang up around coal veins. The pollution of the city and the industrialization of pastoral
lands spurred responses from the urban naturalists designing parks in clever mimicry of
natural systems to the popular mythology of the American Romantics, yawping from
rooftops their visions of a natural order that may never have existed.
American industry persisted through political scandals, wars and workers' riots,
transforming the recalcitrant agricultural fixation of the South and conferring prosperity
on some immigrants in the Northeast and Midwest. The vast wealth and reach of the
Robber Barons or Ford and his breed of industrialists obscures the neighborhood scale
that characterized much of American industry. In working- and middle-class
neighborhoods in Warren, Ohio and Dorchester, Massachusetts, locally-owned machine
shops, meat packing plants and water cooler factories provided jobs for skilled workers
who lived within walking distance. These small-scale industrial operations sustained
neighborhoods and towns, anchoring neighborhoods by providing cash flow for local
shops and schools and-often by virtue of organized labor-providing dignified
employment with decent wages. The less auspicious aspects of industrial operations-
pungent smells, smoggy and discolored air, and polluted waterways-were perceived by
many of the affected as an unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of employment and
productivity (Solitare 2005).
The evolutionary trajectories of domestic politics and international economics
converged to frustrate the relationship between industry and American neighborhoods.
The dismantling of mass transit systems, paralleled with heavy government subsidies in
freeways, facilitated an exodus of families from city neighborhoods to the new suburban
rings. Racial cohesion among newly-defined "white" immigrant groups and racial
tensions unresolved in the civil rights movement led to de facto segregation as white
families fled to racially homogeneous suburbs and black urban neighborhoods struggled
with the capital starvation of redlining practices. Regional and international economics
contributed to the shuttering of industrial operations, both large and small. As the
organized labor practices in the Northeast and Midwest, which enabled skilled workers to
negotiate wages and benefits, tamped the profits of industry, corporations moved their
operations to Sunbelt states with less sophisticated labor movements or to developing
countries with far lower wages. Corporate consolidation proved too competitive for
smaller industrial operations. In other cases, technological advances or resource depletion
rendered specialized facilities obsolete. The confluence of these factors left vast amounts
of abandoned industrial operations: small sites even less than an acre in the hearts of
residential neighborhoods, huge petrochemical or energy facilities along urban
waterways, and mountains of mining tailings in tribal lands. Until the early 1980s, the
redevelopment of these sites was almost entirely market-driven, enabling the ready
development of homes, schools and parks on former industrial sites (Geltman 2000).
The adoption of environmental regulations paralleled these economic and social
pressures, converging to further reshape American industry. In 1976 Congress passed the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which regulated the disposal of
chemicals by active industrial operations--in essence regulating future disposal of
hazardous waste (Scheller 2005). Although environmental laws governing the emissions
of operating facilities emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, no statutory requirements existed
for the cleanup or containment of previously disposed waste until 1980 (Scheller 2005).
Discovery of chemical pools and decaying storage drums in the suburban yards of
Love Canal, New York, raised the popular perception of risk surrounding industrial
contamination and made a national figure of Lois Gibb, the suburban mother who rallied
for federally-guided cleanup and resident relocation. Back in the early 1900s the
industrialist William T. Love developed what came to be known as Love Canal, a
channel connecting the Upper and Lower Niagara Falls to generate electricity from the
hydropower of the falls. When economic and technological constraints killed the canal
project, the site became a municipal and chemical dump. After thirty years of multiple
owners and operators depositing chemical and industrial waste onsite, the Hooker
Chemical Corporation capped the canal and sold it to the city for one dollar (Beck 1979).
Houses and a public school were developed on land surrounding the canal in the mid-
1950s. Though chemical leakage was investigated as early as the 1960s, the EPA cites
federal investigation as having begun in 1978, after an explosion in March triggered by
unusually high rainfall (Beck 1979). Chemicals leaching from their underground storage
pooled in yards and basements, displaced a swimming pool, and burned children playing
on soil. Residents also exhibited elevated white blood cell counts (a possible precursor to
leukemia) and reported abnormally high numbers of miscarriages and birth defects (Beck
1979). Within the year, the state department of health recommended that all pregnant
women and children under two years of age evacuate, and the state agreed to purchase
239 homes closest to the canal (Love Canal 2007).
The cleanup of twenty-thousand tons of chemicals forced the Environmental
Protection Agency to undertake its first residential hazardous waste cleanup and thrust
industrial contamination into the national consciousness (Beck 1979). A lawsuit filed in
1979 by the US Department of Justice against the Occidental Chemical Corporation (the
parent corporation of Hooker Chemical Corporation), was complicated by the canal
having had multiple owners and operators potentially responsible for the contamination,
including the United States government (Department of Justice 1995). The scale of
contamination, the stark images of chemical pools and disintegrating drums in a suburban
neighborhood, and the accounts of ill and injured white, working class women and
children lent the incidents in Love Canal a visibility not afforded other environmental
exposures. The national focus on Love Canal led to a series of Congressional hearings on
hazardous waste which revealed the limitations of existing regulations and led to the
passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) of 1980, also known as the Superfund Act (Raettig 1996).
The weight of CERCLA lies in its definition of liability for cleanup, written
broadly to ensure that those responsible for contamination cannot hide behind the
uncertainty created by transfers of land ownership or facility operation. CERCLA
identifies all past or current owners and operators, and any parties who arranged for the
disposal of waste or transported waste to the site, as potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) (Burnham-Howard 2004; Scheller 2005). Liability as defined by CERCLA has
three significant components: it is retroactive, meaning that any party who owned or
operated the site may be found liable for its cleanup even if they adhered to existing laws
during their time of ownership, tenancy or usage of the site; it is strict, meaning a party
can be found liable for contamination even if they used the best-available technology to
avoid contaminating the site; and it is joint and several, meaning a PRP can be liable for
the entire cost of cleanup regardless of that party's alleged extent of contaminant
disposal, length of ownership or tenancy, unless the party can prove dumping by other
parties (Geltman 2000). Costs and damages include those costs associated with cleanup
of hazardous materials and health studies for contaminant exposures as well as damages
to natural resources (Burnham-Howard 2004). Broad liability ensures a source of funding
for cleanup costs, either by pooling assets from multiple owners and operators or by
assigning the entirety of costs to the party with the most assets.
In the years following the passage of CERCLA companies continued to purchase
and sell industrial facilities much as they did before 1980. But as the law was tested in
court and its financial implications became better defined, companies altered their
behavior, becoming more protective of these potential liabilities. Major corporations
especially began to regard their industrial facilities as the chink in their armor, a
vulnerable point of access to their considerable assets. While a local machining or
engineering firm may not have the ability to cover costs of cleanup, usually ranging from
$100,000 to several million dollars, publicly-traded behemoths like General Electric or
Boeing can afford to pay, and can be found liable for the entirety of damages under
CERCLA's joint and several liability. As a result, companies like GE regularly mothball
retired properties-fencing them off and maintaining them on their balance sheets rather
than selling. Mothballing an industrial facility which the owner suspects of contamination
has been regarded as perfectly legal due to a peculiarity of CERCLA which assigns no
liability for cleanup until contamination is found. No statutory language compels cleanup
of suspected contamination, only verified contamination, creating a "don't ask, don't tell"
policy between companies, shareholders, and regulatory agencies. Though recent
accounting reforms including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act make the practice of mothballing
properties more costly and may be responsible for the recent upsurge in divestment of
retired industrial facilities, it is not yet clear how broad an impact these laws will have on
corporate brownfield policies (Leone 2006; Rogers 2006). All things being equal,
companies prefer properties without suspected contamination to those suspected of
contamination, leading to development of new industrial parcels on greenfields, the term
for non-industrial, often formerly agricultural land (Geltman 2000). Aversion to
investment in potentially contaminated properties extends to private lenders as well, who
can be found liable for contaminated properties pledged as collateral, leading to a new
type of redlining-greenlining, in which some banks routinely deny loans in communities
with suspected pervasive contamination (Bartsch & Munson 1994; Geltman 2000).
During the 1980s and early 1990s it became increasingly clear that the statutory language
surrounding contamination and liability had the unintended effect of arresting the cleanup
and redevelopment of industrial facilities. Perception became a primary market force, a
phenomenon that took almost a decade to recognize and over a decade to name.
The Velvet Claw: Regulatory Force and Development Incentives
The term brownfields, describing abandoned and potentially contaminated
properties, emerged in the early 1990s and gained salience through the advocacy and
awareness campaigns of mayors in Northeastern and Midwestern cities suffering most
from industrial decay. The advocacy of such mayors as Richard M. Daley of Chicago led
to the first round of EPA brownfield pilot grants in the mid-1990s, still a staple of limited
federal funding made available to cities for brownfield redevelopment (Sheahan & Coley
2002). Today the official definition of brownfield, as given by the EPA, is "real property,
the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant" (EPA 2007). A
brownfield may be an industrial, commercial, institutional or even residential property,
though most brownfields fall within the first three categories (McCarthy 2002; Alberini et
al. 2004). The EPA estimates the number of brownfields in the United States at more than
450,000 parcels (EPA 2007); other estimates run to more than a million parcels
(Burnham-Howard 2004). No master list of recognized brownfields exists, due to
disparate regulation split among state environmental agencies and the EPA.
The EPA is the primary federal agency responsible for the interpretation and
enforcement of CERCLA, as well as the primary federal agency involved in brownfield
redevelopment. As such, the EPA determines federal cleanup standards for soil and
groundwater according to the intended end use of the property, administers funding to
states and local municipalities for brownfield redevelopment, often in the form of grants
for environmental assessment of individual properties, interprets and establishes federal
enforcement guidelines for CERCLA, and prosecutes federal cases against parties found
to be in violation of CERCLA. Potentially Responsible Parties can apply for federal
liability relief, which protects them from future liability from previously undiscovered
contamination. The Department of Housing and Urban Development also offers some
grant funding for brownfield redevelopment through its Brownfields Economic
Development Initiative (BEDI), used to improve the viability of development projects
benefiting low- to mid-income neighborhoods.
Most states have enacted their own versions of CERCLA, state regulations which
define standards for soil and groundwater cleanup and which establish guidelines and
liability for hazardous waste cleanup. The Brownfields law of 2002 requires states and
tribal governments to establish response programs with capacity to oversee the
assessment, cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields (Tucker 2007). State
environmental agencies are typically the primary agency responsible for oversight of
brownfield redevelopment, funneling federal and state funding to individual projects,
reviewing cleanup plans and negotiating liability indemnities with land owners,
developers and other PRPs. States establish their own cleanup standards for soil and
groundwater, which may be stricter than the federal standards set by the EPA. State
agencies also establish institutional controls designed to limit human exposures to
remnant contamination after cleanup, including deed restrictions (also known as activity
and use limitations), which stipulate prohibited uses-such as gardening or water well
usage-which survive title transfer. Many states have developed privatized cleanup
programs, often called voluntary programs, in an effort to ease the burden on state
resources and thereby improve the speed and volume of brownfields redevelopment. As
part of such privatized programs, licensed professionals with experience in environmental
engineering serve as private consultants to PRPs. The autonomy and discretion afforded
these licensed professionals varies by state. In some states, voluntary programs do not
require state notification until all environmental assessments and remediation have been
completed and the PRP files with the state for liability relief (McCarthy 2002). In such a
memorandum of understanding, often called a covenant not to sue, the state agrees not to
pursue legal action against the PRP in the event of future discovery of contamination,
barring negligent action (McCaffery 1997). Some states and tribes have negotiated a
Voluntary Response Program Memorandum of Understanding with the EPA, which
extends federal liability relief to parties who have obtained state or tribal liability relief
(EPA 2006).
Cities and counties typically have limited involvement with liability relief and the
technical aspects of brownfield cleanup, but regularly influence the allocation of public
brownfields funding from federal and state sources. Many recipients of EPA brownfields
grants are local municipalities, which use the funding to build brownfield inventories,
develop hazardous materials training or subsidize showcase projects meant to spur
brownfield redevelopment within a metropolitan area (McCarthy 2002). Local
governments tend to perceive abandoned and vacant land as economic losses, and
describe brownfields in economic terms-lost taxes, decreased property values and
diminished land productivity.
Though the federal and state statutes which define brownfields use the language
of environmental science--contaminant dosage, risk assessment and remediation--the
incentive programs designed by federal, state and local governments tend toward
economic incentives targeting developers. Developers shy away from liability and
unknown cleanup costs, and much policy effort is channeled into the creation of subsidies
and liability relief to reduce the perceived risk of investment (Meyer & Lyons 2000;
Alberini 2004). Recent federal activity surrounding brownfield redevelopment has
centered on clarifying liability for prospective purchasers in an attempt to remove that
barrier to private-sector brownfields redevelopment. The Small Business Liability Relief
and Brownfields Revitalization Act, an amendment to CERCLA passed in 2002, attempts
to clarify potential liability for prospective purchasers (Burnham-Howard 2004). The
Revitalization Act also instructs the EPA to issue guidance on its "all appropriate
inquiries" rule (AIA). The AIA guidance, published in 2005, requires prospective
purchasers to have interviewed past and present owners, operators and occupants of a
property and to have reviewed historical sources in order to gain federal liability relief
(Black 2005).
Liability protection-both from additional cleanup cost and third party liability-
is highly valued by developers whether or not they have experience in brownfields
redevelopment (Alberini 2004). Direct public funds to subsidize environmental
assessment, cleanup and development are also used as financial incentives for investing
in brownfields. Less-experienced developers tend to overvalue cash incentives tagged to
project completion (Alberini 2004). However, developers with brownfields experience
and those who invest in large-scale brownfields projects often avoid public funding in an
effort to limit red tape and public participation requirements attached to public funds
(Meyer & Lyons 2000). The level of public participation required for programs receiving
public subsidies is extremely limited; if a developer uses the entirety of a $200,000 EPA
grant to pay for a truck to remove asbestos from a construction site, the developer is only
required to address trucking of the asbestos at a public hearing (Tucker 2007).
The private sector has responded to the financial risk presented by CERCLA by
developing specialized industries to limit liability for brownfield investors.
Environmental insurance and special purpose vehicles-partnerships created for single
development projects-facilitate redevelopment of large brownfields sites by shielding
developers from future liability claims and cost overruns resulting from discovery of
unknown contamination (Alberini 2004; Mueller 2005). For the majority of redeveloped
brownfields, cleanup is funded by private investment (Meyer & Lyons 2000). Since
1980, environmental remediation has become a big business. A wide range of
remediation technologies have been developed to extract, neutralize or contain
contaminants, which range from heavy metals, such as lead and arsenic, to petroleum
(which is not regulated by CERCLA), to volatile organic compounds, critical
intermediate chemicals for modem manufacturing. The technique used to treat the
contaminated medium depends on several factors, including contaminant type, the
contaminated medium (soil, groundwater or both), the intended end use of the property
(residential, commercial or industrial), and the amount of funding available to pay for
cleanup. Conventional remediation technologies include capping, in which the
contaminated soil is sealed with layers of material which prevent human exposure to
liquids and vapors emanating from the soil; soil vapor extraction, in which groundwater
contamination is pumped and treated and the cleaned groundwater is sent back into the
water table; and soil excavation, in which contaminated soil is dug out, solidified (usually
with concrete) and sent to a hazardous waste disposal facility (Reddy et al. 1999). With
funding the typical limiting factor, "cleanup" often describes more affordable
technologies such as soil excavation and soil capping.
The policy focus on developer incentives such as subsidies and liability relief
overlooks other significant barriers to brownfield redevelopment, including zoning
battles, demolition costs, awkward parcel sizes, suboptimal infrastructure, unqualified
labor force and litigation (Alberini 2004). Additionally, brownfields in low income
neighborhoods may elude redevelopment because investors prefer better-understood
markets (Bernanke 2006). For example, the standard calculations of purchase power for
individual households conceal the cumulative purchase power of dense low-income
neighborhoods, creating misperceptions about market feasibility among lenders and
developers (Seidman 2005). Such imperfect information likely will not be corrected or
compensated for by environmental assessment grants and liability relief, the typical
incentives of states and federal brownfield programs.
Recent brownfields support from the White House tends to focus on the economic
benefits of brownfield redevelopment, emphasizing the language of investment and
private sector. The language of environmental quality and economic development can
conceal or distort the actual outcomes of brownfield redevelopment. Claims of improved
environmental quality tend to overlook the institutional controls, such as zoning changes
and deed restrictions, used to limit the extent and cost of cleanup by restricting land use
to limit potential human exposures rather than removing or neutralizing contaminants
(Alberini 2004). Similarly, economic development and its benefits to populations
negatively impacted by languishing brownfields may be distorted by the metrics of
economic development agencies, which focus on job gain and tax revenue without
necessarily tracking the beneficiaries (McCarthy 2002).
Brownfields and the Chronic Wasting of Neighborhoods
The past uses and industrial histories of many cities suggest that contamination,
either real or perceived, is the rule not the exception for urban properties. Many
brownfields are abandoned neighborhood fixtures, such as dry cleaners and gas stations.
Rural areas and tribal lands may be plagued by defunct mines or artillery ranges. While
decaying industrial cores may have sprawling multi-acre sites, many brownfields are
financially infeasible for individual development because they are "small, oddly shaped,
poorly linked to infrastructure, or located in residential neighborhoods" (Greenberg 2002:
703). The typical size of brownfields varies according to studies, but those which focused
on municipal inventories, rather than nationwide searches based on media coverage,
found median size of an acre or less (Alberini 2004).
Brownfields taint neighborhoods. They threaten environmental quality and
environmental health through contaminated groundwater, soil and air (through off-
gassing) which can affect not only people who venture onsite but also those in the
surrounding area. A study of a Baltimore neighborhood with many brownfields found
high incidences of a variety of illnesses and increased mortality compared to nearby
neighborhoods with fewer brownfields (Litt et al. 2002). Brownfields can introduce
public health risks through criminal activities because vacant land and abandoned
buildings do not appear to be owned or tended by anyone and attract illegal uses
prevented in other places by the cumulative vigilance of regular activity (Spirn 1990).
Brownfields become dumping sites and criminal hotspots, introducing other forms of risk
into neighborhoods (Solitare 2005). To discourage dumping and vandalism, brownfield
owners erect chain link fencing around their perimeters, creating voids that fracture
neighborhoods and complicate redevelopment.
Brownfields have more inertia than other abandoned or vacant sites. Unlike the
vacant housing lots that perforate many declined neighborhoods, brownfields cannot be
reclaimed by residents with informal pocket parks and community gardens because
owners face liability from injuries through contaminant exposure. Abandoned industrial
sites may evoke strong emotions and have high visibility, both for long-time residents for
whom they symbolize lost jobs and economic struggles and for recent residents who may
associate them with crime, vacancy and blight (Solitare 2005). But brownfields are less
often cited by residents--either in personal accounts, neighborhood meetings or
community mapping studies-than other neighborhood phenomena perceived with
greater urgency (Vajjhala 2007; Wallace et al. 2006). Air pollution hotspots, crime-
plagued corners and traffic-clogged streets, which are perceived as greater threats or
inconveniences, capture more attention in neighborhood politics than industrial facilities
that may have been abandoned for years. Community dialogue around brownfields
usually centers on the social, transportation and economic issues related to
redevelopment, not environmental contamination (Solitare 2005).
In community meetings and individual conversations feeding into a community
visioning process in Dorchester, MA, residents rarely raised concerns over lingering
contamination from past industrial uses, and spent far more time discussing parking,
traffic, crime and asthma perceived to be caused by buses and diesel trucks running
through the neighborhood (Wallace et al. 2006). Dorchester has some of the highest
poverty rates in Boston, the densest housing and many vacant and abandoned buildings,
with many abandoned industrial properties embedded in residential neighborhoods.
Community development corporations interested in acquiring and developing some of the
brownfields along Quincy Street and Ceylon Street in connection with the potential
development of a commuter rail stop had organized the visioning process to strategize
acquisition and do initial legwork to establish community buy-in on future development
projects. When discussing potential end uses for brownfields in the neighborhood,
residents were most interested in finding out how proposed affordable housing would
impact them in terms of affordability and crime, how construction jobs and long-term
employment on the properties would contribute to employment of current residents, and
what impact development would have on local traffic and parking constraints. When
health and safety emerged, discussion focused on violence, insufficient health care and
asthma, prevalent public health crises in communities of color (Wallace et al. 2006).
For many communities burdened with brownfields, the terminology dominating
the language of the public and private sectors has little meaning. This mismatch is not so
much a problem of vocabulary but of framing. Brownfields-as spaces of lost
employment, blight and contamination-are perceived by communities as one piece of
the complex landscape of neighborhood development, which cannot be captured strictly
in environmental or economic terms (Solitare 2005).
Brownfields are community assets that can be leveraged to yield benefits beyond
increased tax base and jobs, including open space and community venues in undersupply
in many urban neighborhoods. Projects with high social return but low financial revenue
demand extraordinary coordination and planning to marshal resources. Considerable
planning is also necessitated for scattered, small brownfields which can be more
efficiently redeveloped in coordination rather than as isolated sites (Alberini 2004).
Clustered brownfield redevelopment may create economies of scale for remediation
technologies and environmental insurance, provide internal subsidies to support products
with lower return on investment, increase the rate of return to the developer vis-a-vis
single parcel development, and provide concentrated benefit within a neighborhood
(Alberini 2004). However, private industry tends to focus almost exclusively on large
projects with competitive internal rates of return. If unmarketable brownfields are to be
realized as community assets it will be through the efforts of local communities and the
support of publicly funded planning processes aimed at strategizing brownfield
redevelopment.
Brownfield Inventories in Practice
To learn how local governments have undertaken brownfield inventories I
interviewed EPA and state grant recipients in Alabama, Kentucky and New Jersey. My
Kentucky and Alabama case studies came from the GISfor Brownfields Toolkit provided
by ESRI at the 2006 EPA Brownfields Conference; I was referred to the New Jersey
inventory by my contact in Alabama. When possible I spoke with the people who had
initiated the inventories as well as the staff responsible for continuing maintenance. To
contextualize my conversations with inventory makers I also spoke with brownfield
professionals with experience at the EPA, the Massachusetts state environmental agency
and a private developer specializing in environmentally-impaired properties.
Of Mandates and Muddling
Although the majority of brownfield redevelopment projects are funded
exclusively with private financing, public funding still plays a primary role in new
brownfield markets and for small projects in developed markets. In fiscal year 2007 the
EPA made fifty million dollars available to states, tribes and local governments to
capitalize revolving loan funds for brownfield redevelopment, to purchase environmental
insurance or develop other brownfield insurance mechanisms, to create brownfields
inventories, conduct environmental assessments and fund cleanup (EPA 2007).
According to Carol Tucker, Brownfields Program Section Chief of EPA New England,
many grant applicants are "return customers," grant recipients from a decade ago who
seek public funding to assess or remediate properties identified in brownfield inventories
funded by their original grants (Tucker 2007). Though millions of dollars of public
funding are spent each year based on the results of brownfield inventories, there is hardly
any transparency in the ways inventories are conducted and sparse documentation of
prior inventory practices to transfer knowledge between practitioners. Consequently there
is very little available information to judge how effective inventories are in spurring
brownfield redevelopment.
The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002
mandated the creation of brownfield inventories for states and tribes without a Voluntary
Response Program Memorandum of Understanding, an agreement which extends federal
liability relief to grant response actions that have received state liability relief. The
explicit goal of these inventories is not to create a list of brownfields but to estimate the
number, location and type of brownfields in state and tribal lands (EPA 2006). The
unstated motivation for inventories is to justify funding requests to Congress by
demonstrating the large number of brownfields across the country; the EPA Brownfields
budget has enjoyed significant increases in recent years after cutbacks in the Clinton era
and early years of the current administration. Though the EPA has the authority to
mandate brownfield inventories for state and tribal governments entitled to federal
funding to establish brownfield response programs, the agency does not have the
authority to stipulate a particular inventory process. State and tribal inventories funded by
authorization of section 128(a) of CERCLA must be timely and publicly available,
though not necessarily web accessible. Significantly, the EPA does not require states or
tribes to restrict inventories to properties with contaminant release reports, but may
include any brownfield, defined as real property whose redevelopment is complicated by
real or perceived contamination. The flexibility of the mandate paradoxically results in a
burdensome prospect since state agencies have no idea what properties with contaminant
release reports are currently abandoned or underutilized or what abandoned or
underutilized properties without contaminant release reports may be plagued by the
perception of contamination. According to Dierdre Menoyo, former Assistant
Commissioner of the Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup, the office responsible for brownfield
redevelopment in Massachusetts (a state with a memorandum of understanding), the state
negotiated with the EPA to use its 21E list, the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection regulatory list of contaminant release reports, as its brownfield
inventory even though the list includes many active businesses that therefore are not
brownfields (Menoyo 2007). While states may resist performing mandatory inventories,
for many local governments a brownfield inventory is the voluntary first step in
developing a brownfield redevelopment strategy. Municipalities, regional planning
commissions and even federal agencies may apply for competitive assessment grants
authorized by section 107 of CERCLA. The EPA recommends that grant recipients use at
least a portion of their first assessment grant to conduct a brownfield inventory in order to
take stock of the contaminated sites in their jurisdiction and better strategize the use of
public funding for cleanup and redevelopment.
Carol Tucker (who received her Master in City Planning from MIT's Department
of Urban Studies and Planning in 2002) began working in the EPA Brownfields Program
just a year after its inception. Tucker has attended numerous ribbon cuttings for parks,
schools and housing built on former brownfields. She gets a lot of satisfaction seeing
derelict sites returned to use, especially when EPA grants are used to fund projects with
tangible community benefit. For Tucker brownfields are a part of community
development, so she trains her staff to begin dialogue with municipalities around broad
community priorities and plans, whether that includes ball fields, municipal buildings or
downtown revitalization. Though she encourages grant applicants to use money on
projects without market viability or in communities with great need, grant recipients have
considerable discretion in the deployment of grant funds. According to Tucker the EPA
brownfields program retains bipartisan support as an economic development program
because of the discretion afforded local grant recipients on the use of federal funding,
including projects fully eligible for market-rate financing. When Tucker began working
at EPA New England the majority of assessment grants funded inventories; today less
than half of assessment grants in New England support inventories because so many
areas have used EPA funding to identify key sites and support master planning processes.
Tucker has distributed enough brownfield grants to know that a stand alone
inventory is insufficient to spur development. For Tucker, brownfield inventories are
about bringing together stakeholders to prioritize brownfields for redevelopment,
"communicating a plan to the community," and fitting brownfields into larger plans for
growth or revitalization (Tucker 2007). She recommends that grant recipients use some
of their first assessment grant to perform environmental assessments of priority sites and
reprioritize if initial inquiries suggest severe contamination. Tucker's strategies for
making the most of EPA grants come from her considerable experience in a regional
office with the second greatest number of grants delivered in the country. However,
significant variation among EPA regional brownfield programs and the absence of
centralized written guidance for inventory makers results in isolated experiments
throughout the country as individual grant recipients struggle through the same
challenges.
Kenton County Land Recycling Program
Kenton County borders Ohio along Kentucky's northeastern edge. Around
150,000 residents make up the county, with most living in the more urban north (US
Census 2000). The county, still coping with the challenges of vanished industry in its
north, is increasingly becoming post-agricultural in its rural south. As in many American
counties, housing subdivisions are cropping up on former farms while urban parcels lie
dormant. The county seat of Covington sits across the Ohio River from Cincinnati and
once shared in the industrial wealth of its neighbor city. Covington is the biggest city in
the county, one with a downtown: "what you might call a real city" (Kent 2006). With no
room to grow outward, the city began to take stock of economic expansion opportunities
within its developed land.
Inventory Origins
Somewhere in the process of searching for ways to increase the tax base, someone
at the City of Covington got the idea to focus on brownfield redevelopment opportunities.
An EPA grant funded the city's brownfield inventory, performed as a pilot project with
the Northern Kentucky Area Planning Commission, which led to the redevelopment of
some sites identified through the inventory. The city's satisfaction with the inventory
convinced the county to undertake a brownfield inventory for the whole county,
sponsored by the planning commission with technical support provided by Northern
Kentucky University and Link-GIS, a geographic information system for Northern
Kentucky. The planning commission staff member who originated the inventory has
since retired, but Ryan Kent, a GIS specialist at the planning commission who presented
the Kenton County Land Recycling Program at the 2005 EPA Brownfields Conference,
now maintains the database. Kent describes the inventory database as being designed to
support decision making among public administrators by identifying properties with
euphemistically termed "environmental conditions" and providing property details
viewed as being useful for promoting their redevelopment (Kent 2005). Its intended users
include planning commission staff and city officials, including administrators and
mayors. Though technically the inventory is available to the public, who can request to
view it on scheduled visits to the planning commission office, it is not web-accessible.
Interested developers can gain access to the inventory by contacting planning
commission staff (Kent 2006).
Populating the Inventory
When the county began its inventory the project team decided to undertake a
comprehensive inventory of county brownfields, recognizing they would have to go
beyond the traditional government databases; informal or illegal dumps may never have
been reported and long-abandoned factories that operated before the advent of chemical
regulation may have been vacant so long that government knew nothing about them. The
inventory sources included the old regulatory standards, including federal databases from
the National Response Center, RCRA Corrective Action and Superfund. The Kentucky
Solid Waste and Hazardous Waste lists provided open dumps and orphaned municipal
solid waste landfills, while the Kentucky Underground Storage Tank Branch provided
reports of corrective actions on leaking underground tanks. Then the inventory creators
went a step beyond federal and state regulatory lists, including typical sources for pre-
acquisition due diligence such as Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps. To fill in the remaining
gaps, the inventory creators turned to a variety of local sources including fire
departments, mayors, town planning officials, economic development agencies, real
estate professionals and neighborhood associations.
To elicit input from local sources, the inventory creators personally contacted
organizations and local agencies. Contacts were told what types of sites the inventory
creators were looking for: abandoned or vacant parcels with possible contamination,
which may be suspected from the site's prior uses or visual cues such as manufacturing
equipment, rusty drums, or above ground storage tanks (Kent 2006). Though the concept
of a brownfield was new to some, others knew "right off the bat" what properties might
be contaminated (Kent 2006). Looking back at the process, Kent says the information of
some groups were more useful than others. Most of the reliable information came from
city officials, firefighters and police, who usually had a pretty good idea of what sites
might be contaminated. Local planning officials who had been in communities for years
knew of long abandoned parcels. One employee who had worked with the planning
commission since its inception provided a good number of sites through his personal
contacts with community members. Local neighborhood associations were somewhat
helpful but most often the parcels they reported turned out after further investigation to be
nothing more than good, old-fashioned blight: "the property was run down, there was
debris and the grass was too high" (Kent 2006).
The inventory team visited and photographed every parcel suggested by local
sources and compared what they saw to what had been reported. They also ran
background checks on the suggested sites to see if prior uses matched the contaminants
reported by local sources. The county did not have to deal with conflicting reports
between individuals, but did sometimes uncover inconsistencies between the type of
contamination suggested by local sources and past uses as documented in official records:
There were times when people thought a property was contaminated with
something but it wasn't. We found out by checking the site history that the prior
use wasn't consistent with the contamination they suggested. People really didn't
have an idea what the site was contaminated with but thought it might have been
something. (Kent 2006)
To substantiate contaminant claims from local sources, the inventory team checked
Sanborn maps, title records, and other official sources of site history. When the two were
inconsistent, the official records were given precedence. In some cases zoning
administrators who regularly receive and investigate violation complaints gave the
planning commission more information on suggested sites. Sites that passed the filter
were aggregated into a "community-identified" data layer. Kent remembers there was
some overlap between community-identified sites and regulatory lists, but mainly those
properties were "pretty blatant" uses including manufacturing plants (Kent 2006).Though
a document linking local sources to the properties they reported was retained somewhere
in storage, the identifying information was not maintained in the database and that
document linking individual sites to local sources is now probably "buried deep in a box"
(Kent 2006). Out of 229 sites with "environmental history" identified in the countywide
inventory, 23 were community identified (Kent 2006).
Inventory Content
The inventory's linked map and database enables countywide context and quick
access to parcel-specific information, but limits data mostly to physical attributes, site
history and current ownership. The map data layers include aerial photographs from
1999, 2004 and Mylar from 1963, current zoning, roads, parcel and city boundaries,
water and sewer infrastructure, drainage bodies including lakes and streams, hydrological
and topographical contours, Census household information by block and tract (income,
population, ethnicities, ages), a map of the county's five-year comprehensive plan
containing suggested land uses, and locations of real estate development projects of
interest such as condominiums (Kent 2006). The inventory database's site-specific
information includes the source linking the parcel to the inventory (i.e. "National
Response Center Site" or "Community-identified site"), regulatory status, site attributes
that may complicate or facilitate redevelopment (such as parking lots), environmental
response history, Sanborn maps, aerial photos and site photos collected in the course of
inventory development. The database also provides space for indicating whether the site
is considered to be a priority for redevelopment.
Prioritizing parcels for redevelopment falls to planning commission staff in
collaboration with local administrators and inventory technical partners. The parcel
ranking system grew from conversations with planning staff who identified important
characteristics such as distance to transportation infrastructure. For example, if a parcel is
within a half-mile of an arterial or railroad spur, it receives three points; within one mile,
two points, and so on. The more points a site receives, the higher a priority for
redevelopment on the three-tier scale of high priority-medium priority-low priority.
While some local administrators were consulted during the development of priority
attributes, residents' preferences were not elicited or incorporated (Kent 2006).
Liability
When designing the countywide inventory the planning commission followed
course with the City of Covington, which had decided not to provide web access to its
inventory because of liability concerns. By restricting access to the inventory, the county
hopes to avoid damage claims by property owners whose property has been "publicly
classified" as a brownfield and allegedly decreased in value (Kent 2006). Keeping the
inventory off the web reduces the likelihood of litigation though perhaps not the grounds,
since the inventory is not strictly an internal document, being accessible to public
viewing on appointment. In addition to access control, the inventory creators sought to
avoid litigation by employing a general disclaimer, which states: "The sites listed in this
inventory are not necessarily all brownfields. These sites do however have some sort of
environmental history" (Kent 2005). The disclaimer was worded without legal counsel in
an attempt to keep it "as general as possible" (Kent 2006).
Users
With Kentucky's brownfield program still in its infancy many property owners
and municipalities have very little experience with successful redevelopment. The
planning commission sees the inventory primarily as a tool for shifting perception from
one of constraint to opportunity. City administrators "often don't know what they can do
with brownfields; they think they might be able to clean them up but it might not be
worth the money, and they don't want to get involved with a lot of it." The inventory "is
about getting them thinking of brownfields positively instead of just negatively" (Kent
2006). Though the inventory's primary users are public administrators, some private
developers and environmental agency staff have visited the planning commission to view
the inventory. No residents have requested appointments to view the inventory, perhaps
because of a reliance on newsletters and emails from the planning commission to raise
awareness. However, the inventory's low public visibility is consistent with the liability
avoidance tactic of limiting public access.
Future
Without grant funding to sustain the inventory beyond the startup phase, the
county has had to concentrate resources on maintaining the original batch of parcels.
Inputting new sites requires many hours of research, and the county does not have the
manpower to dedicate to that task. Meanwhile, the state of Kentucky has identified
Kenton County Land Recycling Project as a model as it develops its statewide brownfield
inventory in compliance with federal mandate (Petitjean 2007). The state may decide to
do online marketing for priority brownfields whose owners are interested in selling. But
Herb Petitjean, the state brownfield coordinator expresses concern that the lack of
brownfield redevelopment incentives and abundance of greenfields in Kentucky may
have the unintended effect of driving developers away from the marketed properties. The
state may try to make brownfields more competitive with greenfields by using its online
inventory to help potential purchasers find as much public funding as possible.
The state brownfield program may take a few lessons from Kenton County about
the level of responsibility the public should assume for priority brownfields in their zeal
to market them. After conducting its inventory Kenton County acquired and remediated a
few of the most important brownfields. While some of those remediated properties have
been purchased and redeveloped, one site highlighted in the inventory still eludes
redevelopment. The Donaldson Art Sign parcel, a medium priority site in the inventory,
was remediated with the help of an EPA grant but still has not found a new owner.
Renew Alabama: An Alabama Redevelopment Database
World War II-era Birmingham was the center of southern industry and industry
was at the center of Birmingham. Steel, coal and railroad infrastructure sprawled across
the city. When these industries evacuated, they left a corroded cityscape more void than
mass. Now as industry moves south to the Sun Belt, the once declining urban center of
Alabama is gaining population. Downtown loft developments have lured mid- to upper-
income professionals from the suburbs, bringing the once nearly-vacant city center a
permanent population of 3,000. Booming condominium construction is projected to
double that population in less than two years (Wilkerson 2007). Downtown development
has pushed up property values in the urban ring surrounding the city center, land which
once supported Birmingham's industry. Sites like Trinity Steel, a former steel mill
adjacent the middle class African-American neighborhood of Titusville, are now
attracting developers as highly sought as WalMart and Target. Local government is
aggressively marketing sites like Trinity Steel to developers, forming intergovernmental
entities with the exclusive purpose of brokering investment deals. In the case of Trinity
Steel, the Jefferson County Economic and Industrial Development Authority purchased
the site, completed site cleanup, conducted a charrette process, chose the desired end use,
worked some design schemes and started marketing, all within twelve months (Wilkerson
2007). This tactic has proven so successful at garnering attention it actually has given the
local government leverage to demand more than just on-site investment. When the board
turned WalMart down because it wanted more mixed-use on the site, WalMart parried
with what some call an irresistible proposal, offering to invest in infrastructure
improvements and infill housing in the adjacent neighborhood. According to Bob
Wilkerson, a board member of the development authority, attracting multinational
corporations to the industrial wastes of Birmingham would have been "laughable" two
years ago. But not every brownfield in Greater Birmingham can be midwifed by its own
intergovernmental board. To market the vast acreage of underused land a team of federal,
state and local government agencies created the Renew Alabama database.
Inventory Origins
After twenty-odd years in the banking business, Bob Wilkerson went back to
school to study city design. With his master's degree in landscape architecture from
Auburn University, Wilkerson went to work at the Regional Planning Commission of
Greater Birmingham (RPCGB), where he specialized in brownfield and greenspace
master planning. Planning objectives at RPCGB include greenspace preservation-in
recognition of the loss of important ecological systems-and the redevelopment of
abandoned cores. In conversations with EPA Region 4, Wilkerson's office realized that
Greater Birmingham needed a catalogue of its brownfields to help regulatory agencies
track contaminated sites. Wilkerson recognized the opportunity to create a tool for
marketing land, something that would facilitate redevelopment rather than simply taking
stock. Wilkerson crafted the Brownfields Task Force and Redevelopment Initiative
"around the language of economic development," bringing in professionals including
engineers, attorneys, realtors, developers, designers, public agency representatives and
economic development specialists to collaboratively build the brownfield database.
Originally a body of eight people, in four years the task force has grown to a "powerful
network" of over 180 participants, though not all regulars. The task force is action-
oriented, and therefore explicitly not an advisory committee (Wilkerson 2007). Wilkerson
views partnerships among diverse players, including regulators, private-sector
professionals, public sector governments and non-profits, academics and citizens, as the
key to successful brownfield redevelopment.
The inventory is intended to facilitate site scouting by developers. From his
experiences at multiple brownfields conferences, Wilkerson recognizes that "almost
everybody there is in economic development or represents developers" (Wilkerson 2007).
After a few conferences at which he represented the RPCGB, Wilkerson "started getting
calls from folks in Las Vegas, New Jersey, New York, Miami, London looking for sites"
(Wilkerson 2007). In the calls, developers would probe for the same types of information
about available sites, such as proximity to infrastructure and parcel size. Many site scouts
look to Birmingham in search of opportunities for industrial expansion, though some
developers specialize in mixed-use developments and housing in the urban core.
Recognizing the utility of the internet for reaching both domestic and international
developers, the task force molded the web-accessible database to respond to developers
with defined parameters and a familiarity with brownfield redevelopment.
Database development was funded by the EPA, with design and construction
provided by the US Army Corps of Engineers of Mobile, Alabama. The structure itself is
based on the database the Corps used to assist with the Indian Ocean tsunami recovery,
which enabled short turnaround. The task force determined site content of the beta
version. When the Army Corps completed database construction, the task force called a
public meeting to present what they considered to be a finished product. Response to
public notice of the meeting was so "overwhelming," the location had to be moved from
the regional planning commission offices to the headquarters of the Alabama Power
Company. Public feedback from that meeting resulted in substantial changes to the
database, which the task force had viewed as already complete: "They came, we showed
and they gave use a lot of food for thought, including the things they liked, the things
they disliked, things they wanted included and those things they didn't want in the
database" (Wilkerson 2007). With feedback from the meeting, the task force formed a
subcommittee charged with making recommendations for revision. Basic revisions
responded to public recommendations to make the database more user-friendly, jettison
the term "brownfields" from the database name, and create plug-in tabs for various forms
of redevelopment information. Renaming the inventory as the Renew Alabama
Redevelopment Database was one of several redesigns aimed at making the website
"more subtle" for those developers outside the brownfield redevelopment niche
(Wilkerson 2007). The term "brownfields" has not been shed entirely, though; both the
regional planning commission and Army Corps of Engineers inventory web links read
Alabama GIS Brownfields Database.
Populating the Inventory
In agreeing to fund database development, the EPA negotiated a directorial role in
determining the types of sites that would be inventoried. The Brownfields Project
Manager of EPA Region 4 decided to limit the database to sites that had received any
form of public funds, information that was already in the public domain and did not
require the consent of property owners. The regional EPA office worked with the
Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) to aggregate information
on land parcels which had received federal or state funding for environmental
assessments or similar actions. The entire population of publicly-funded sites went into
the database without filtering for size, zoning, or other site attributes. In the hopes of
capturing more visitors to the website, the task force decided to include greyfields
(abandoned shopping centers or buildings without suspected contamination) and infill
parcels, and may eventually use the website to market greenfields.
Although the database includes only those properties which have received some
public funding, the regional planning commission did conduct its own informal
brownfield inventory, which met with extremely limited success. In a seven-county
survey, the planning commission sent a letter "to every county commission, city
government, chamber of commerce, industrial development board, large-land holding
company including US Steel and Alabama Power, who they know have shuttered
properties but have not been officially identified" (Wilkerson 2007). While the
commission received notice of about sixty sites from municipalities, no response came
from any of the companies contacted. The properties which were identified through the
survey--mostly properties owned by municipalities, such as landfills-were brownfields
the planning commission knew about already. At a meeting about the study, a county
commissioner said he wouldn't answer the letter that had been sent because "it scared
him to death and felt like an invasion of privacy" (Wilkerson 2007). Brownfields inspire
fear and privacy protection in private and public owners alike.
Eventually the task force hopes to implement a voluntary participation process
modeled on the New Jersey Site Mart. Fran Hoffman, one of the creators of New Jersey's
inventory, advised Bob Wilkerson as the task force engineered the Renew Alabama
database. Wilkerson views voluntary participation as a way of creating incentives rather
than as a means of avoiding lawsuits. In Alabama,
property owners are under tremendous misperceptions about the way regulatory
agencies will treat them if they own a brownfield, so they basically have
shuttered these properties and found the legal and accounting loopholes to make
it legal. Owners of these properties would like to get rid of these properties but
don't want to call it brownfields. (Wilkerson 2007)
In a voluntary participation framework, the property owner is given the opportunity to
accept or refuse the opportunity to have his parcel of land included in the inventory, with
no repercussions for refusal. By creating a forum for voluntary participation, the task
force hopes to recast the relationship between government and private land owners as one
of cooperation rather than enmity, and to thereby unravel the practices of regulators,
municipalities and property owners that obstruct redevelopment. The task force has not
yet implemented the voluntary structure, which has limited the cache of inventoried sites.
Eventually the task force wants to implement a site nomination system like that used on
the New Jersey Site Mart so anyone can nominate a property for consideration. But
changing administrative authority for the inventory may delay the implementation of the
voluntary participation framework and site nomination tool.
Currently the Greater Birmingham inventory is not enabled to receive site
nominations for potentially contaminated sites and does not present potentially
contaminated sites that have not received public funding. Though Wilkerson views
citizens as an important component of the partnerships essential to brownfield
redevelopment, getting average citizens to participate in the Renew Alabama database has
proven only marginally successful. "In pragmatic terms," says Wilkerson, "the database
is probably most appealing to city leaders and governments who know where sites are
because they're typically blighted and not generating income." Though the task force
wants to "employ citizens to help us build the database," the planning commission, the
primary agency involved in recruitment for the task force, did not take "the time to
identify and step forward to make a concerted effort to get neighborhood organizations in
the task force" (Wilkerson 2007). An attempt to engage neighborhood associations in a
task force meeting by inviting "a hundred some-odd neighborhood associations" by letter
generated response by only about four or five. Along with limited recruitment efforts,
part of the low participation may be explained by the perceived relevance: "Until there is
a site identified in an organization's neighborhood they will not just start coming to task
force meetings" (Wilkerson 2007). But, Wilkerson added, once redevelopment activity
for a neighborhood brownfield gains steam the planning commission does try to
encourage involvement of neighborhood associations and local community development
corporations.
Wilkerson cites public participation as a key determining factor for public funding
allocation in brownfield redevelopment. For Wilkerson a key part of public engagement
is creating dialogue with private property owners:
If I'm encouraging a community to do a grant application for the EPA, I tell them
they need to establish public dialogue and document it. They need to call a
couple of public meetings. On a recent project the city called one meeting in
September and one in October. It's a small city but they identified property
owners of potential brownfields and personally invited them to the public
meeting. When they presented their plan to apply for a petroleum grant, they had
people with vested interest and evoked intelligent discussion. The regional
newspaper captured that and it became a valuable piece of marketing and
communication. The EPA likes to see evidence of public engagement. When you
turn in a grant application, and say what your outcomes of redevelopment might
be, they want to know if people have weighed in and if you've had public
meetings. (Wilkerson 2007)
Certainly private property owners are part of the public and have very-well defined
stakeholder interest in brownfield redevelopment policy. The task force is not a decision-
making body for permitting brownfield redevelopment, nor is its mission one of
arbitrating land use disputes. The task force facilitates brownfield redevelopment by
enabling dialogue among various and sometimes historically antagonistic actors both
within task force meetings and in the forum provided by the database. However, through
participant recruitment and database design, the task force influences who participates
and what ideas are transmitted in that dialogue.
Inventory Content
The US Army Corps of Engineers maintains the inventory content in conjunction
with EPA Region 4; edits suggested by the task force must be forwarded to one of these
two agencies for approval and entry. Site information on the Renew Alabama
Redevelopment Database is fairly extensive, including GIS mapping layers providing
limited site context. Many of the parcels in the database are accompanied by photos of
current site conditions and a site history narrative, including operations and potential
contaminants. Available environmental assessments are included in individual portfolios,
outlining the contaminants known to be on site, the distribution of contamination, and a
description of any cleanup activity to date. Some sites also contain written descriptions of
potential end uses, such as the Vulcan Rivet and Bolt file, which describes work between
the City of Tarrant and Auburn University to develop a reuse plan including a
transportation drop-off, open-air market, shops and green space, and remediating plant
species including poplars.
Through his design training Wilkerson has learned the power of images. Though
currently the database does not provide room for visual renderings from design
charrettes, Wilkerson believes that would be "another vital and attractive potential for
voluntary sites database, because images have the power to attract and sell pieces of
property" (Wilkerson 2007). A design charrette for the Tarrant Vulcan Rivet and Bolt
project organized by the design firm at which Wilkerson currently is employed had a
strong influence on the firm's receipt of cleanup funds and $300,000 from the
Brownfields Revolving Loan Fund of ADEM (Wilkerson 2007). In addition to making
projects more competitive for public funding, charrettes "show the community the
possibilities of redevelopment and what city leaders are thinking about to get citizens
excited or get them to show their own visions" (Wilkerson 2007).
Liability
Though the task force did not dig into legal case studies to characterize the risks
associated with the database, inklings of liability shaped the database structure and
content. Wilkerson acknowledges that there is "horrendous liability" in the notion of
mistakenly identifying someone's property as a brownfield (Wilkerson 2007).
Furthermore, outing brownfields is inconsistent with the mission of the database: to
enlighten municipalities and property owners to the opportunities provided by
brownfields. Liability avoidance shaped the initial decision to include only those parcels
having received public funding, and makes the framework of voluntary participation very
attractive to the task force. But it would be inaccurate to say that the decisions made were
strictly a matter of litigation avoidance. Mediated through a multidisciplinary task force
and directed by a designer with private-sector background, the database is explicitly a
tool for recasting the punitive dynamics between regulators and brownfield owners. The
voluntary participation model the task force hopes to emulate is about offering services
and resources rather than mandating participation, extending a friendly hand to
brownfield owners and demonstrating the potential for productive and beneficial
collaboration:
That's how they did it in New Jersey. They compiled a list of sites thought to be
brownfields, sent a friendly letter to the owner to say, "You might be a
brownfield, if you think you might be, we'd like to include you in our Site Mart."
Then they follow up personally, one property at a time. That's how movements
get started and if people have successful, profitable deals, the word gets passed
around and the thing gets a momentum of its own. (Wilkerson 2007)
Future
The task force counts among its successes raising the profile of brownfields
among chambers of commerce and other local decision makers, and thereby
"precipitating projects that would not have come to fruition" (Wilkerson 2007). But its
hopes to expand the inventory by implementing voluntary participation and introducing a
site nomination tool may be frustrated by impending administrative changes. Though the
regional planning commission originally was slated to assume responsibility for database
maintenance, personality conflicts led the EPA to broker the deal with the Alabama
Department of Environmental Management. Putting the database under ADEM's
guardianship contradicts the tacit mission of the database: to disentangle the notion of
brownfields from the "authoritative control" wielded by the regulatory agency
(Wilkerson 2007). As long as the database is attached to ADEM, property owners will
never voluntarily register their land as a brownfield, argues Wilkerson. This has as much
to do with financial disincentives as fear of regulatory censure. The cost of applying to
the Alabama voluntary cleanup program is upward of $15,000, compared to $1,500-2,000
for a comparable program in Georgia. Application in Alabama does not assure admission
to the program. Chronically underfunded and understaffed, Wilkerson argues that ADEM
is hard-pressed to fulfill its present missions, let alone take on the inventory. Even if
ADEM were able to recruit voluntary brownfields, without a regulatory mechanism to
purge undeveloped sites from the inventory, ADEM may be in the position of tracking a
growing number of brownfields in perpetuity. Therefore not only may property owners
be loath to nominate their sites to the inventory, but ADEM has a disincentive for adding
to its current catalogue of brownfields. Perceiving the inventory to be at risk, the regional
planning commission may opt to build a "cloned database": a duplicate copy
administered by a different organization capable of managing voluntary sites (Wilkerson
2007).
New Jersey Site Mart
New Jersey's central location between Boston and Washington, D.C. fuels high
property values and secures a solid economy, with residents receiving some of the highest
incomes in the country (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2007). Though industrial
economies along the eastern seaboard have shrunken considerably, the state's ports
continue to play a vital role in national trade and it remains one of the national hubs of
the pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries. But despite its booming economy and high
standard of living, New Jersey has not shaken its reputation as the poster child for
industrial waste.
Inventory Origins
The New Jersey Site Mart grew from the New Jersey Brownfield and
Contaminated Site Remediation Act of 1998, which created the Governor's Brownfields
Redevelopment Task Force to operate independently of the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection. The brownfields task force--composed of public and private
sector actors-was charged with providing policy recommendations to the legislature and
state government offices and specifically tasked with creating a brownfield inventory for
the state. The inventory emerged through the efforts of two uniquely qualified, if
somewhat unlikely champions.
Lori Sheppard had a history in municipal politics, including time served as mayor.
In 1997 when she came to work at New Jersey's newly formed Redevelopment
Authority, Sheppard received a call from the state's Department of Community Affairs
inviting the Redevelopment Authority to participate in the New Jersey Brownfields
Redevelopment Interagency Team (BRIT). Sheppard had never heard of brownfields,
along with many people in her office, but "drew the short straw," becoming the agency
representative (Sheppard 2007).
When she came to the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs Office of
Smart Growth, Dr. Fran Hoffman was skeptical of brownfield inventories. Before coming
to work for the state, she had worked with the EPA to assess the agency's 300 pilot
brownfield grants, "to find out what was working, what wasn't, to network and provide
supportive resources" (Hoffman 2007). Many of the grant recipients had spent the
$200,000 they received on local brownfield inventories. In her conversations with these
grant recipients, Hoffman found that generally they targeted areas perceived as being
important for redevelopment in the city at large rather than taking stock of all brownfields
in the city. A town in Connecticut "that went to extremes" worked with the Weston
Consulting Company to develop a software package that would rank different
brownfields to assess which sites were more likely to be ready for redevelopment, on
which public efforts would be focused. At the end of the two years of development and
$200,000, the municipality felt that what they knew from the gut was more reliable and a
lot cheaper than what they had gained from the inventory. Despite being skeptical of
costly, time-consuming inventories, Hoffman eventually concluded that a brownfield
inventory for New Jersey was worth the effort. New Jersey was "so close to being built
out" and open space preservation was so strong, economic growth necessitated
brownfield redevelopment. The state's smart growth policies created strong incentives for
developers to work on already-developed land. Elected officials wanted higher visibility
for brownfield incentive programs, and developers wanted more information on
incentives. The combined forces of public and private demand drove the inventory
forward (Hoffman 2007).
After passage of the state brownfields act, the task force spent the first couple of
years figuring out what information would be needed, "a long, arduous process with
discussion after discussion" (Sheppard 2007). The task force consulted at length with
private sector specialists including real estate developers who helped the task force sift
the "really essential information" from the "unnecessary" (Hoffman 2007). The
Brownfields Site Mart home page bills itself as making "it easier for developers to locate
and build on land in cities and towns," advertising "State & Local Incentives : Liability
Relief : Streamlined Process : A Better Bottom Line." But an equally important purpose
of the Site Mart is to facilitate information sharing between local municipalities and the
state.
Populating the Inventory
The task force had been charged with compiling an inventory of brownfields, but
had no idea what type of brownfields to inventory or how to gather relevant information.
The task force began by looking to existing inventory efforts within the state. The New
Jersey Institute of Technology had been documenting former industrial sites within the
state's ports, funded by the New Jersey Transportation Planning Authority and with
assistance from the Department of Transportation. Growth around the ports was booming
and the state wanted to understand the number of underutilized sites, the extent of
contamination and what would be needed to promote warehouse development. The
information incorporated into the port inventory was insufficient for the statewide
inventory, and the task force realized it needed to dig deeper and broader to meet its
agenda (Sheppard 2007). Next the task force consulted the Department of Environmental
Protection database of contamination events, a comprehensive list of all spills and
releases that had been reported to DEP. The DEP database included active businesses and
residences, land uses beyond the brownfields rubric defined by the state, which was
limited to abandoned or underutilized commercial and industrial properties. To narrow
the DEP list, the task force realized it would need to employ the efforts and knowledge of
municipalities (Sheppard 2007). At this point, licensing and customizing software for the
brownfield database had already cost the state $100,000 (Sheppard 2007). After a six-
month hiatus during state elections, and with money from the EPA, the state hired new
staff to work personally with local economic development directors and other local
contacts to populate the database (Hoffman 2007).
In 2002 when Fran Hoffman joined the Department of Community Affairs Office
of Smart Growth, the inventory project was already straining under tensions between
municipalities and the state staffers soliciting participation. Hoffman says: "some of the
state staffers contacted municipalities and demanded participation, and you never get
anywhere doing that. It's a hard sell anyway and local governments don't appreciate
being told what to do" (Hoffman 2007). Hoffman waited to pursue the inventory for a
while, "to let feelings lie and figure out if it was really needed, if it made sense to expend
so much energy on it" (Hoffman 2007). After a few months, outreach staff started visiting
municipalities armed with 3.5" floppies of the DEP database, working one-on-one with
local staff to compare DEP-listed sites with local records to weed out active businesses
and other uses beyond the brownfields definition (Sheppard 2007).
The handful of state staff members deployed to ground truth the DEP database
struggled with the workload, not only because of the sheer number of properties needing
cross-checking but the investment needed to generate and sustain interactions with
municipalities. Of 560 letters requesting municipal contacts for the brownfield database,
five mayors responded. Even when state staff were connected with local contacts and
spent hours introducing them to the database, municipal staff--deluged with their own
workload-reneged on commitments to complete database cross-checks. Attempts to
compile EPA-funded local inventories into the state inventory met with limited success
since many of those inventories were already out of date (Sheppard 2007). Eventually the
task force struck upon a more successful method of populating the inventory, creating the
County Municipal Academic Partnership, which pairs municipalities with academic
institutions to gather and import local information into the brownfield database (Sheppard
2007). This system provided the much-needed manpower driven by hard-and-fast
semester deadlines. When the grant money ran out and the task force could no longer
keep staff hired to build the inventory, CMAP provided the labor to keep the inventory
going, cross-checking and entering one thousand sites in a single summer (Hoffman
2007; Sheppard 2007).
Community organizations have collaborated with some municipalities to populate
the New Jersey inventory, but collaboration is constrained (at least in part) by the limited
resources available to nonprofits. Housing and Neighborhood Development Services, Inc.
(HANDS) assisted the city of Orange with the inventory after having partnered on a
brownfield pilot project. Students from Montclair College inventorying brownfields for
the city of Orange had mistakenly identified a photographed building as being on an
adjacent brownfield; the director of HANDS caught the error and notified the site
administrator (Sheppard 2007). Though Sheppard suggests that community organizations
engaged in real estate development "add to the richness of inventories" by notifying
municipalities of preliminary site assessments they have performed as part of pre-
acquisition due diligence, or by informing the municipality of former uses that might not
be captured in documentation-"if a munitions factory was actually an old shoe
factory"-these organizations were rarely tapped in the Site Mart inventory (Sheppard
2007). Sheppard cites capacity limitations and resource shortages as primary concerns for
involving community organizations. Like other public actors, nonprofits have an easier
time finding program money than administrative funding, which limits the amount of
effort they can invest in projects peripheral to their core missions (Sheppard 2007).
Technically the design of the New Jersey Site Mart enables participation by any
interested party. Any visitor to the Site Mart may nominate a site to be considered for
entry into the inventory; the user must only register a name and password by providing
contact information and affiliation as a Municipal Reviewer, State Reviewer or Guest.
The nomination form requests information on the property owner, site history (prior and
current uses), condition of existing buildings, site photographs, proximity to utilities,
infrastructure and protected or sensitive ecological areas, environmental history
(contaminant releases, environmental assessments or litigation), municipal contacts,
property value, inclusion in a zone that might confer financial incentives (Main Street,
Environmental Opportunity Zone, Brownfields Development Area, Urban Empowerment
Zone, etc.), and the status of any predevelopment studies performed (market research,
traffic studies). The form also provides space for a Site Description, with explicit
emphasis on its importance:
If more space is needed for Site description, please attach separate sheet. Please
keep in mind the importance of the description. This is the first thing a Site Mart
visitor will see. It needs to be the "hook" that will grab someone's attention and
encourage them to look at the details of the site.
Municipal contacts or student interns perform a background check on every
nominated site to verify it as a "brownfield" under the state definition and cross-check
submitted information with the property owner as well as environmental, tax and zoning
records. The site nomination function of the Site Mart website was developed for two
primary functions: to encourage property owners to register their abandoned or
underutilized commercial or industrial properties with the state, and to facilitate
information sharing between local municipalities and the state. Although technically
anyone can nominate a site to be considered for the inventory, the majority of nominated
sites come from municipalities updating records with the state. Recent edits to the site
nomination tool emphasize the utility of the site nomination tool as a means of
synchronizing information between government agencies. In order to limit redundant
paperwork, New Jersey's site mart nomination tool was recently modified to include
information required in reporting to the EPA Assessment Cleanup and Redevelopment
Exchange System (ACRES), designed to track the progress of EPA Brownfields grant
recipients (Sheppard 2007).
Though the inventory was mandated and developed by the state, municipal
management can make or break it. An automatic tracking system requests status updates
from municipalities every ninety days for files that have not been edited within that time;
if the municipal contact does not respond the file is "thrown into the delete pile"
(Sheppard 2007). At one point the inventory had to be shut down because so many files
were at risk of deletion.
Inventory Content
The Site Mart is a sequel database built on a content management system called a
"dynamic site framework" (Sheppard 2007). Guests to the website see only the "front"
end of the database, which currently has less than one hundred sites. Registered
municipal and state users have access to both the front and back ends of the database and
can search all categories including incomplete files, those pending redevelopment and
those already redeveloped (Miller 2007; Sheppard 2007). Individual files contain the
information requested in the site nomination form. Though the file indicates whether or
not an environmental assessment has been conducted, the results of any environmental
inquiry is conspicuously absent from the website. The database organizes information
into a brownfields dossier searchable by geography rather than a brownfields map. For
each brownfield, the database contains a clear and concise written description with a few
accompanying pictures. Though the website provides a link to the DEP brownfield map,
that map provides more graphic context in terms of ecological biomes than urban zones.
There is no dedicated space for suggested end uses, either in the nomination form
or the database structure, though municipalities sometimes use the additional memo field
to include a description of potential reuse, such as "6 acre former shoe factory in area in
need of redevelopment; suitable for redevelopment as housing" (Sheppard 2007).
Sometimes end uses may be suggested through other fields such as zoning (Sheppard
2007), though often-and especially in areas in need of redevelopment-the desired
outcome is to change the land use (Hoffman 2007). Though it is up to the municipality to
determine the suitability of recommending end uses, Hoffman cautions that suggestions
might have the unintended effect of limiting development possibilities if the property
owner or municipality has not given ample and creative thought to what could go there.
Hoffman suggests that instead of suggesting end uses, a municipality may want to issue a
Request for Proposals (RFP) to see what developers suggest. The extra legwork required
to provide meaningful suggestions for end use also may delay listing a brownfield on the
inventory (Hoffman 2007).
The interagency team attempts to make clear to developers, especially those who
have limited experience in New Jersey, that municipalities regularly exercise their power
to restrict land use, particularly in areas in need of redevelopment (Hoffman 2007).
Tracking tools on the inventory website indicate that the majority of developers using the
inventory are based outside of New Jersey, mainly in California, Virginia, Pennsylvania
and New York (Sheppard 2007). This is why the database was designed to direct
interested parties to the municipality directly rather than one of many state-level agencies
with decision-making power in brownfield redevelopment, explains Hoffman:
municipalities know the state resources available for particular projects and in many
cases have to approve redevelopment plans. The task force wanted interested developers
to contact the municipality as soon as possible, often directing developers who called the
state to look at the Site Mart and get an idea of what sites are out there. Says Hoffman:
You have to get out and talk to people in counties and municipalities, the people
you'll have to relate to anyway and who you'll have to get to know on their turf.
They will lead you to properties where they will be likely to permit
redevelopment because those permits are as important if not more than state
approval.
The interagency team encourages developers to conduct visioning charrettes "to give
opportunity for consensus to be developed and real solid buy-in from all members"
(Hoffman 2007). Essentially the database is perceived as a jumping-off point for
collaborative redevelopment.
Alan Miller, Brownfields Program Manager at the Brownfields Redevelopment
InterAgency Team and current Site Mart coordinator, views the inventory as being
handicapped by a lack of relevant information on the likelihood of redevelopment. Sites
on the public portion of the database are identified as "Available for Redevelopment."
But that designation does not necessarily mean that the parcel is on the market: "We can
do windshield surveys, do tax surveys, but we don't know whether it's a priority for the
municipality, or whether the owner wants to redevelop." Although the Site Mart tells you
there are many brownfields in the state, it "doesn't tell you what buy-in there is in the
municipality" for redevelopment of that particular site (Miller 2007).
Liability
During development of the state brownfield inventory a lawsuit was filed against
the New Jersey Department of Transportation related to a list created by the agency of
contaminated properties-properties which turned out to not be contaminated. The
lawsuit created "instant paranoia" on the task force (Hoffman 2007). A small
municipality in southern New Jersey also was threatened with a lawsuit by property
owners who learned about the inventory. The thorough brownfield list generated by the
city has never been forwarded to the task force (Hoffman 2007).
In response to potential liability, the task force created a multilayered process for
reviewing site nominations. When a site is nominated, the database sends an email to the
municipal contact who reviews the nomination and determines whether the site fits the
state brownfield definition and whether the information agrees with local records. If the
municipal contact rejects the nominated site, she explains why. Whether the nomination
is accepted or rejected, the municipal contact forwards the nomination to the DEP to
review and compare with departmental records. The outcome of both reviews is then sent
to the Site Mart administrator who reviews the comments and confers a status on the
nominated site: available for redevelopment, pending redevelopment, incomplete, etc.
Sites available for redevelopment are posted on the "front end" of the database, where
they can be reviewed by anyone; those pending redevelopment or with incomplete
information are held on the "back end" of the database until the status changes. By
requiring three reviewers, the task force hopes to mitigate personal agendas, and ensure
that properties are not illegitimately identified as brownfields (Sheppard 2007).
Before a property can be listed on the public portion of the database, the property
owner must sign a waiver (Sheppard 2007; Miller 2007). Only recently the task force had
decided--upon consultation with the state attorney general and extensive case law
review--that since the law did not require the state to gain permission from property
owners to make files public, incomplete files or those without waivers could be posted on
the public portion of the database. The newly-elected governor has since directed the
interagency team "to take it more slowly than that" (Miller 2007). To flesh out the public
portion of the database, which currently only has 88 sites, the team has decided to import
sites from the "back end" of the database that are cross-listed on the DEP list of known
contamination, itself a public database. That cross-linking will bring the "front end" of
the database to 530 sites. Even though contamination of those parcels is already public
knowledge through another state agency, property owners will be notified by letter and
have thirty days to decline and provide reasonable supporting arguments (Miller 2007).
The interagency team hopes to include even more sites on the public portion of the
database by cross-linking the protected portion with lists of sites that have documented
environmental assessments stemming from property transfer or pre-acquisition due
diligence. That will add an additional 240 sites, bringing the public population of the
database to around eight hundred (Miller 2007).
Future
Though only 88 properties are on the public portion of the inventory, the site
administrator reports that 130 inventoried brownfields have been redeveloped. Those
redeveloped properties are listed on the back end of the inventory but will eventually be
moved to the public portion of the database as "success stories" (Miller 2007).
Assumedly those properties were either redeveloped as a result of developers being
funneled to municipalities by expressing interest in a different parcel listed on the public
end of the database or were redeveloped separately from the inventory. Since those
redeveloped sites were never on the public portion of the inventory it seems that the
primary role of the Site Mart may be as an impetus for municipalities to prioritize parcels
for redevelopment. The state has not yet reviewed the redevelopment of parcels listed on
the public portion of the inventory (Miller 2007; Sheppard 2007). The study may have to
wait a few years, since brownfield redevelopment can take a good amount of time from
identification to construction completion (Miller 2007; Sheppard 2007).
The New Jersey Site Mart changes substantially as state administrations and
interagency staff members come and go (Hoffman 2007; Sheppard 2007). As powerful a
force as liability avoidance is, the inventory's greatest challenge may be overcoming
political resistance to the negative label of brownfield. The environmental commission of
Garfield, New Jersey created a comprehensive brownfield list by combining the
Department of Community Affairs list with a windshield survey. What began as a large
pool of sites ended as a short list after generous editing by the mayor, who "said he did
not want his city to be labeled the brownfield capital of New Jersey" (Hoffman 2007).

The Shift from Inventories to Plans: Analysis and Recommendations
The inventory makers I interviewed worked with limited guidance and resources,
creating inventories out of individual tenacity. They faced many of the same challenges,
negotiating liability, political cold feet, and complex tensions between private property
rights and public will. My analysis and recommendations are crafted with the aim of
sharing lessons learned by these inventory makers with other local governments
struggling to define brownfield redevelopment agendas and with the state and federal
grant makers who provide guidance to these local governments.
Inventory Lessons
Land recycling, renewal, commerce. These proxy concepts supplant the term
brownfield in each of the inventories, which are carefully scripted to cultivate a new
perception of brownfields among developers, property owners, municipalities and the
public at large as opportunities for economic growth and community development. But
while the term brownfield is scrupulously avoided it does linger, either to harmonize with
existing government programs that govern or facilitate redevelopment or to enable
internet searches by the faraway developers these inventories are meant to attract.
Attracting Development
While inventory makers in Alabama and New Jersey recounted experiences of
developers seeking real estate deals, it is not at all clear that developers use web-
accessible inventories to identify properties. Susan Hollingshead is the founder and
managing principal of Renova Partners, a California-based development firm specializing
in environmentally-impaired properties. Typically Renova's clients are corporations
seeking to divest properties while managing environmental liability. Though Renova
develops brownfields all over the country, the majority of its projects have been in the
East or West Coast where property values are high enough to support privately-financed
redevelopment. According to Hollingshead, Renova rarely uses online inventories since
they tend to focus on properties that are either too small or require public-private
partnerships because the land value is too low to justify the cost of remediation.
Hollingshead could not recall any Renova projects found through an online inventory and
speculates that many inventoried properties are more likely to be redeveloped by
"conventional developers from the area with close relationships with the redevelopment
agency" (Hollingshead 2007). Indeed it seems that while developers may scan online
inventories, they do not seem to provide any added value in terms of their success in
funneling developers to municipalities. Various accounts suggest that developers find
municipalities independent of inventories by contacting staff at EPA regional offices,
state redevelopment authorities and regional economic development agencies, who direct
them to municipalities matching their expressed interests. Therefore a municipality
should know not just where its brownfields are, their sizes and proximity to infrastructure
but be able to communicate a coherent redevelopment strategy to local developers and
regional and state agencies with higher visibility to outside developers. Instead of looking
at inventories as a marketing tool in themselves, they should be perceived as a
deliberative process of crafting a brownfield redevelopment plan so that municipalities
can actively pursue investment, locally and, where appropriate, nationally.
Inventories have had indeterminate success in catalyzing private sector
brownfield redevelopment. The Donaldson Sign Art property prioritized in the Kenton
County Land Recycling Project has not been redeveloped despite expenditure of public
funds on its cleanup; as a medium priority site, it is not clear why it was selected to
receive public funding in the preliminary rounds. In New Jersey the majority of
redeveloped properties were not listed on the public portion of the inventory, calling into
question the purpose of the controversial public website and obscuring the role played by
the inventory or municipal governments in spurring that redevelopment. Trinity Steel-a
property never inventoried in the Renew Alabama database-attracted competitive bids
from multiple corporations and has received more public attention than any inventoried
brownfield. Though it may be too soon to account for the utility of brownfield inventories
for facilitating site redevelopment, none of the inventories appear to have structured
measurement tools into the databases themselves. Properties expunged from the database
may not be captured in future analyses, and the resources invested to gather information
on those lost sites will be concealed. Brownfields counted as redeveloped may or may not
have been redeveloped as a result of the inventory, and may only reflect market dynamics
free of public intervention.
Planning for Brownfield Redevelopment
The inventories were established to help public officials understand the
brownfield terrain in a given place by providing basic descriptions of sites-how many
there are, what they look like, where they are-essential information for developing
anything other than a piecemeal approach to distributing public funds for their
redevelopment. But the inventories had limited success at creating a concept of
brownfield stock that supported strategic decision making. Because the sample
inventories were designed to spur private redevelopment they tended to focus on the
physical attributes of individual brownfields-size, condition of current buildings, prior
uses, results of preliminary environmental assessments-with hardly any contextual
information on the demographics and land uses of the surrounding area. The size and
proximity to infrastructure of a brownfield tell public officials very little about the way
redevelopment of that brownfield will shape surrounding areas or how that property fits
into larger plans for the area. Brownfields should be prioritized not based on the general
characteristics important to developers but on the centrality of that brownfield to
neighborhood, city or regional plans for future development. For example, inventory
makers should consider the impairment of the surrounding neighborhood and the relative
importance of a particular brownfield to its redevelopment. Rather than waiting for the
developer to suggest the end use the inventory process should be exploited for the
opportunity to deliberate over many possible end uses and identify the most preferred
alternatives. In short, for inventories to be meaningful they must be integrated into land
use and development planning exercises.
Incorporating brownfield inventories into larger plans not only ensures that
redevelopment of individual brownfields supports citywide goals, it also improves the
likelihood that municipal agencies will continue to support the inventory because it is
explicitly linked to their own agendas. Soliciting and sustaining participation among
municipalities was one of the biggest challenges faced by the New Jersey and Kentucky
inventory staff because brownfields were not perceived as a central concern at the
municipal level. Municipal staff resisted assisting regional or state agencies in performing
property background checks and maintaining files on inventoried properties in part
because they did not have the funding or mandate to participate. To compensate, the
agencies in Kentucky and New Jersey used state and EPA funding to hire staff dedicated
to populating and maintaining the inventories, only to realize they did not have the
funding to retain those staff once the EPA grant expired. Like any other public initiative,
the official organizational structure underlying the inventories belies the centrality of a
few champions willing to weather political tides and funding droughts. Legislative
mandates and regulatory requirements may lend an inventory an air of structural
longevity, but the departure of a dynamic individual can leave it to atrophy. Municipal
governments are essential to populating and maintaining inventories because they have
better knowledge of historical land uses, tax records, real estate activity and community
priorities and struggles. Tying brownfield inventories into municipal or regional planning
may not resolve staffing shortages since property background checks are inherently
resource intensive. But it will help realize the true purpose of inventories-to prepare
local governments to guide development-and potentially inspire greater cooperation
between municipalities and the agencies undertaking brownfield inventories.
The flexibility of EPA assessment grants allows for an inventory to be constructed
any way the grant recipient chooses, including planning processes with a focus on
brownfields. In Alabama and New Jersey much of the funding supported database
construction, leaving little left over for populating the database. Rather than spending
$200,000 on a sophisticated database, grant recipients may instead direct this money
toward planning processes incorporating brownfields as a focus area. If the purpose of the
inventory is to spur a few projects demonstrating the benefits of redeveloping
contaminated land it is not necessary to design a comprehensive inventory. Inventory
funding may be best spent on a pilot project in a given geographic area or on identifying
properties best suited to a particular reuse such as pocket parks. Unless the locality
awarded the grant is exceptionally small or municipalities invest their own resources,
attempting to create a comprehensive inventory in the three year life span of an EPA
grant is unlikely to provide a well-defined strategy supporting anything other than
isolated successes.
Planning for Realistic Redevelopment
Regional economics and local demographics influence the kind of brownfield
redevelopment that can be accomplished. Priority site characteristics should reflect the
realities of the regional economy and local goals for growth. Low property values and a
suppressed economy are unlikely to support the profit margins demanded by corporate
real estate scouts and large developers. The economic resurgence in Sun Belt states like
Alabama is not likely to be shared soon by the Steel Belt states of Ohio and Michigan;
priorities for brownfield redevelopment should acknowledge those constraints. For
traditional land uses brownfields cannot compete with undeveloped land unless growth
restrictions increase the cost of developing previously undeveloped land or brownfields
have a locational advantage to populations or services. If neither of those factors is true in
a given place, it does not make sense to prioritize large parcels for traditional industrial or
commercial development. Instead industrial sites may be reclaimed to fuel a new
economy, as exemplified by the brownfield-to-brightfield project in Brockton,
Massachusetts in which a brownfield was redeveloped as the nation's largest photovoltaic
array with funding from a variety of state and federal agencies (Morey 2007).
Many brownfields will not be marketable without public support because the
economic circumstances that created them are still in play. A strategic inventory can
realize multiple opportunities for productive reuse of contaminated land. Brownfield
redevelopment can put delinquent properties back on the tax rolls and create
employment. But even brownfields with little potential for creating cash flow or jobs can
become great assets that leverage additional investment and make a municipality more
competitive in attracting new residents and businesses. Neighborhood parks create more
competitive housing markets. Health centers provide needed health care and stabilize
desperate neighborhoods. Community centers provide adaptable space for youth and
senior activities and cultural events. The final priority properties should be those most
likely to facilitate development in the surrounding area and create a cascade of
investment. The value and importance of a property does not necessarily correlate to size
or marketability but may have more to do with proximity to struggling commercial
corridors or potential to provide critical services to underserved populations. Realizing
the true value of underused land means returning land to use for the benefit of its
neighbors. Creating whole places is not something that can be done through the market
alone or even through comprehensive planning by those in power, but requires
community-wide participation.
Involving Communities
Though communities should play an essential role in inventories from conception
to application, the relationship between inventory makers and communities is convoluted
by liability, politics and biases about reliable or useful knowledge. The shape that an
inventory takes depends on the priorities and past experiences of the individuals directing
it as much as the priorities of the mandating body. In the case of the Renew Alabama
Redevelopment Database, Bob Wilkerson's dual background in finance and design led
him to recruit task force participants with experience in finance, development,
construction, engineering and design. In New Jersey, Lori Sheppard's experiences as a
mayor told her that the inventory would be most successful by connecting developers
with municipalities from step one. The planning commission staff member who designed
the Kenton County Land Recycling inventory, a long-time county planner, sought out
neighborhood associations and other community members to flesh out the regulatory lists
of contaminant releases. The previous experiences of an inventory administrator enable
resilience and creativity but also can constrain the social networks she perceives as
legitimate or reliable resources.
The Kenton County Land Recycling Program staff solicited participation from
neighborhood associations and public safety personnel to identify brownfields eluding
regulatory databases. Of the three inventories studied, Kenton County had the highest
level of community participation built into the inventory process. However the
information gathered through community participation was limited to identifying
potentially contaminated properties and gathering anecdotal property histories;
prioritizing properties for redevelopment remained the purview of the planning staff and
end uses were market driven. When performing property history reviews, official
documentation outweighed local input, potentially omitting sites with illegal activities not
captured in property records.
In Birmingham, the few attempts to invite neighborhood associations into the fray
received limited response. Low turnout could be attributed to a lack of saliency for
neighbors of brownfields not slated for precipitant redevelopment, especially if the
invitations were framed in terms of brownfields rather than neighborhoods. The term
brownfield has little meaning to most laypeople; for many of those more familiar with the
concept, brownfields are an issue of environmental concern and therefore not perceived
as relevant in the face of more pressing environmental and social threats. As with the
other inventories, community participation was viewed as being essential to
redevelopment but something done in response to redevelopment proposals, not in
anticipation.
The New Jersey task force and interagency team felt that public participation was
more appropriate at the municipal level, where it would be necessitated by municipal
politics. Opinions on the point at which end uses should be negotiated differed according
to the staff member, with some asserting that the enumeration of desirable end uses in the
Site Mart might hinder development. The site nomination tool, which enables anyone to
nominate a property, appears to be driven by a need to centralize data collection from
municipalities, not to facilitate the participation of non-professionals. Though the
organizers of the Site Mart provided several examples of instances in which local
knowledge might provide better information than official sources (including prior uses)
the site nomination tool's verification process defers to official documentation, meaning
that illegal or undocumented land uses may slip through the cracks.
New Jersey responded to the lean side of the funding cycle by creating a program
pairing municipalities with academic institutions. Though student teams bring technical
skills and manpower to the inventory, their limited knowledge of the place sometimes
results in potentially costly errors not caught by municipal representatives, as illustrated
by the case of mistaken brownfield identification in Orange, New Jersey. As people with
day to day knowledge of a place, communities may have unique knowledge of prior land
uses, contamination events, and potential reuse. If brownfield redevelopment can be seen
as central to the attainment of community goals, residents and organizations may offer
time and information to the creation and maintenance of a brownfield redevelopment
plan, crucial for local governments working with limited funding and manpower.
Whether in site identification, funding prioritization or inventory maintenance,
communities were seen as the last group to be involved. While inventory makers
regarded developers and academic institutions as essential partners, communities were
perceived as having limited capacity to support the process, both in terms of expertise
and resources. But they have an essential role to play in deliberating redevelopment
priorities, identifying properties and appropriate end uses and keeping local governments
abreast of pending real estate transactions. Community organizations have a constant
neighborhood presence and know which properties have new tenants, which have become
vacant, which have been taken off the market: valuable knowledge for inventory
maintenance.
Clearly community organizations have varying capacities for participating in
brownfield planning. As Lori Sheppard argued, many organizations are hanging on a
shoestring and have no surplus resources to invest in an inventory. The organization's
mission will determine its capacity and interest in participating, and many community
organizations--even organizations in areas with lots of abandoned land-may not view
brownfields as relevant to their mission. Nonetheless, some community organizations
have identified brownfields as a primary part of their mission, and many others have
unexpectedly found themselves engaged in brownfield redevelopment. Bethel New Life,
a church-affiliated community development corporation on Chicago's West Side,
developed its Industrial Triage process as part of its asset-based community development
approach:
building on the strengths and capacities of the people and the place, starting with
what we have, with what people know and want. We turn liabilities (like
brownfields) into opportunities for "smart growth" in an urban community
context. (Bethel New Life 2007)
Bethel New Life developed its Industrial Triage system to assess the redevelopment
potential of former industrial parcels by considering four factors: real estate value and
marketability, extent of environmental contamination, potential to contribute to local
jobs, and applicable financial incentives and programs that will enhance the project's
viability (McCullough 2006). Bethel New Life's reputation as a leader in community-
based brownfield redevelopment led to an EPA-funded collaboration with the American
Planning Association, directed at the production of a workbook and training module to
engage community groups in brownfield redevelopment.
The participation of community organizations may undermine the perceived
legitimacy of the inventory in the eyes of property owners, developers or politicians.
Local knowledge does not mean apolitical or agenda-free knowledge. Many community
organizations thrive on politics, exerting political pressure through regular
communication with elected representatives, establishing defensible catchment areas
recognized by delegates, or fueling internal programs with public funding. Others have
explicit political agendas and may have participated in resistance efforts or antagonistic
interactions with property owners, city officials and local politicians. Lest the political
nature of local knowledge deter inventory creators from seeking it out, it is important to
briefly address the political tendencies of professional knowledge.
The real estate developers, engineers, designers and municipal employees
engaged in brownfield task forces, being viewed as apolitical, are bestowed with the
mantel of professionalism. Despite the perception of these actors as apolitical, their
decisions on what information is important, how to test the credibility of information
based on its source, and how to attract the participation of property owners are value-
based and therefore political decisions. These politics are couched in the language of
professionalism: the language of aesthetics, market demand, statutes and risk assessment.
These actors' shared objectives--creating an environment attractive to investors and
returning land to the tax roles-are deemed apolitical because they do not obstruct
development, though they may attempt to direct it. Divergent goals among professional
groups are contested in methods less overtly antagonistic than politics such as
competitive bidding. Students from partnering academic institutions, having no financial
stake or political history in a particular area, are viewed as neutral information processing
units. But students also have objectives (sometimes overtly political) and time constraints
which favor expedient processes for assessing and inputting information, sometimes in
contradiction to espoused principles.
Political resistance to collaboration with community organizations will likely
correlate strongly to the discretion afforded them. If community organizations were given
the same discretion as students in New Jersey's CMAP program-entrusted with
property background checks and allowed to input files to the database-there would
likely be substantial opposition from property owners and the elected officials held
publicly accountable. But if community organizations were invited to nominate sites for
inventory inclusion, and those nominations were then subjected to review by public
officials or a "neutral" entity, there will likely be less opposition. Activities in which
community organizations might be included in brownfield inventories and the superficial
advantages and disadvantages of that engagement are assessed in Table 1.
Table 1. Community Knowledge Inclusion
Knowledge Injection Advantage Disadvantage
Designing inventory Adds to richness of database Labor-intensive to identify
relevant groups
Labor- & time-intensive design
sessions
Identifying brownfields Uncovers brownfields not listed Requires site history review
in regulatory databases (background check)
Leverages community May inflame property owner
visioning/inventories already
undertaken by community
organizations
Reporting undocumented land Suggests possible contaminants Without blatant evidence of the
uses (e.g. illegal dumping) on that otherwise may not be tested undocumented use, may be
known brownfields for difficult to determine credibility
of information
Part of site history documentation
required environmental Suggestion of persistent and
assessment procedure for EPA's costly contaminants may deter
all-appropriate inquiry rule (rule property investment
only stipulates interview with
adjacent property owners) May inflame property owner
Suggesting end uses Leverages community Depends on capacity of
visioning/inventories already organization
undertaken by community
organizations Suggested end uses may not seem
feasible or desirable to interested
Potentially leads to consideration developer, obstructing investment
of more innovative real estate
products
Potentially lowers political
resistance to forthcoming projects
by initiating dialogue between
developer and community
Performing background checks Supplements limited manpower Requires training on historical
on nominated sites & funding land use documentation and
contaminants correlated with land
uses
Potentially compromises
credibility of inventory by
delegating fact checking to group
without professional training and
with particular political or
development agenda
Reporting status changes on Constant neighborhood presence Relies on vigilance of community
parcel availability enables real-time updates organizations
Involving communities in brownfield inventories can be intimidating as inventory
makers are acutely aware of the threat of litigation from injured property owners. Fear of
liability to injured property owners contributed to the design of all three inventories. To
hedge against the threat of litigation inventory makers performed extended background
checks on properties proposed by community members and municipalities, typically
weighting property records more than anecdotal accounts of past use. Kenton County's
decision to keep the database off the internet may limit its utility for attracting outside
developers to the county, and may even limit its usefulness for individual cities. While
Bob Wilkerson viewed New Jersey's voluntary participation as ideal, that model has been
debilitated by its risk avoidance. The new administration in New Jersey is so risk
avoidant it abandoned inventory expansion plans approved by the attorney general as
being within the bounds of the law, and plans to allow property owners to decline
participation even when contamination on those properties is already a matter of the
public record.
Avoiding Litigation
The threat of litigation by property owners is not easily dispelled but can be
mitigated by employing parallel strategies. First, inventory makers should recruit
brownfield ambassadors: former brownfield owners who have successfully navigated
redevelopment and can share their experiences with current owners. Second, framing
brownfield inventories as part of larger planning processes redirects the focus from the
disposal of potentially contaminated properties to the fulfillment of larger community
goals.
Although local governments generally create inventories to market sites for
redevelopment, they often omit the most crucial selling point of any property: whether
the current owner wants to sell. Getting information on prior uses and future prospects
from property owners is one of the greatest challenges faced in building an inventory. For
many property owners the prospect of publicly listing their properties as environmentally
impaired opens the door to regulatory fines, legal battles and plummeting property
values. Written invitations to property owners to nominate their properties to an
inventory rarely elicit responses. Without the weight of regulatory compulsion property
owners have little incentive to participate and plenty of incentive to respond defensively.
But without the participation of property owners, brownfield inventories provide little
information on which owners might be more likely to sell. Property owners who have
engaged in brownfield redevelopment can provide crucial diplomatic ties between
municipalities, environmental agencies and brownfield owners. Seeing proof of other
owners' profitable deals may convince owners that it may be in their interest to dispose
of properties.
Framing the conversation with property owners around planning for
neighborhood redevelopment may further reduce tensions by redirecting the focus from
liability; this reframing is better suited to non-regulatory agencies without a history of
punitive action against property owners. However, in some political environments the
concept of planning will hardly be more palatable to property owners than the concept of
CERCLA liability. It is worth recognizing that the sacrosanct nature of property rights
evolves with the pressures of urbanization and the attendant political development of
communities. As declining cities repopulate and booming cities meet the limits of their
growth, the staunchest property rights advocates may assert the need for planning.
A Process Outline
I do not propose an idealized process for conducting a participatory brownfield inventory.
What I propose responds to funding shortages, antagonistic property owners, indifferent
municipalities and a dormant citizenry. I attempt to create a method for eliciting
participation that will go beyond the token participation of a few development-minded
"community" members, while acknowledging the time constraints placed on EPA grant
recipients, grants that encourage public participation while limiting the time agencies can
spend soliciting participation. The process I outline may be more appropriate for
municipalities or regional planning commissions than state-level agencies; at the state
level, establishing meaningful contact with community organizations may be untenable,
and demanding that municipalities engage community groups likely leads to little more
than token participation.
Performing an in-depth inventory throughout a large municipality or region will
likely be a time-consuming endeavor with little return, and will necessitate a consistently
high recurring investment for maintenance. By creating a pilot inventory with a few
responsive municipalities and community organizations the sponsoring agency can
achieve the short-term goal of identifying key sites ready for redevelopment with less
cost and time. Even if the task force's long-term goal is to involve as many municipalities
and organizations as possible, attempting to do this in the short-term will be resource-
intensive and ultimately may be futile. Some municipalities will not respond to requests
for participation. Luckily, county, regional and state-wide inventories are not required to
be comprehensive. The earlier an inventory spurs redevelopment, the more likely it is to
elicit participation from other municipalities and build a track record with state and
federal agencies to ensure future funding. By demonstrating the inventory's role in
generating successful redevelopment and explicitly linking redevelopment to local
objectives, the task force may best elicit participation.
The inventory should be framed as a community planning process with partnering
municipalities and organizations designed to identify underused properties that can be
leveraged to achieve local goals. The first step of the planning process is to decide what
types of properties to identify based on geographic and physical characteristics. Once
priority typologies are determined, the partners must identify properties. Regulatory lists
of contaminant releases and regulatory actions are of little use for identifying
brownfields; many of the properties listed are active businesses or stations along utility
pipelines, not underutilized or vacant properties. Additionally, many sites perceived as
being contaminated have not made it onto regulatory lists because no contamination has
been reported. Uncovering brownfields takes detective work: combing through regulatory
lists, talking with municipalities, economic development directors, public safety officials
and community organizations. Many people have little familiarity with brownfields and
need to be guided through visual indications of contamination and typical prior uses.
Once information has been collected from participants, it must be tested against official
documents of land use. Not all past uses of a property will be captured in official
documents, especially sites that have been vacant for many years and have become
hotspots of illegal activity such as chemical dumping. Anecdotal information that does
not match official sources should be corroborated by multiple independent sources in
order to build a substantial burden of evidence.
The planning process should be used to identify the metrics for prioritizing
brownfields for redevelopment, taking into account both the physical characteristics of a
property and its role in the surrounding area. A property's anticipated contamination is as
central to its role in strategic redevelopment as its other physical characteristics such as
the condition of existing buildings or size. Some otherwise attractive properties may be
expected to have astronomical cleanup costs based on their prior uses or may be
surrounded by parcels with severe contamination. Other metrics might include proximity
to important land uses such as commercial corridors or schools, severity or frequency of
crime at or near the property, its potential to fulfill key needs in the surrounding
community such as affordable housing or its potential for innovative developments such
as clean energy fields. Planning meetings may also be used to define appropriate
development incentives, desired end uses and possible proposed end uses unacceptable to
the community. The planning process will also reveal the properties most in need of
public subsidies such as brownfield grants or low-interest loans used to leverage
financing for projects that cannot sustain themselves. These planning meetings prepare
the municipality to issue richer Requests for Proposals with greater details on proposal
requirements or bonuses for mixed-use development or commitments to hiring local
residents for construction. For privately owned properties the planning process may be
used to refine requirements for permitting including peripheral investments that would be
required of developments over a certain size.
Early in the process the sponsoring agency should meet with state counsel to
determine legal responsibility for notifying property owners. An inventory that requires
voluntary participation of property owners may result in very few documented properties.
If the brownfield inventory is part of a larger planning process, there is less need to
obtain the consent of property owners, in the same way that zoning changes and
community visioning meetings do not require property owner consent. However, a
planning process will be more substantial if property owners are involved. The first
communication with property owners of potential brownfields should include contact
information of former brownfield owners who can field questions about the process and
offer their own experiences; former brownfield owners also should be present at planning
meetings. Development incentives and subsidy programs for property owners may be the
key focus of breakout groups at meetings.
Ribbon cuttings, media coverage and civic events are important to creating the
hype needed to scale up the inventory beyond the pilot phase. In the short term the
inventory's success may be indicated by the number of municipalities demanding to be
included, but from the beginning the convening agency should put in place tools for
measuring long-term effectiveness. A GIS-based inventory will enable periodic spatial
and demographic assessments to see where investment is flowing, who has been excluded
and what effect the brownfield initiative has had on the wider community.
There is an irresolvable tension between creating locally relevant brownfield
inventories and allocating resources efficiently. Building and maintaining centralized
inventories may be complicated by local resistance from municipalities resentful of top-
down directives without matching funds, and without local participation the inventory
will be no more useful than existing regulatory databases. Federal grants cannot
perpetually support local inventories, and with the majority of inventory grant money
funding software acquisition and development, little remains for long-term maintenance.
There seems to be little logic to devoting precious funds to redundant software
construction for unique inventories in any given place, yet municipalities and regions
may have distinct priorities demanding different platforms. As more municipalities and
regions build brownfield inventories, the EPA may consider funding the construction of a
standard platform with customizable database and mapping features, providing a more
affordable option than a custom-built database.
A Need for New Resources
For brownfield inventories to contribute to dynamic plans participants at all levels
must acquire the capacity to engage in planning. Communities have the advantage of a
pending publication and training modules created in collaboration between the American
Planning Association and Bethel New Life. The Community-Based Brownfields
Redevelopment Strategies program is intended to help "community groups in low-income
communities develop a new set of 'eyes' to see brownfields sites as opportunities" (APA
2007). The APA should create a similar resource to help local governments design
planning processes for brownfield redevelopment. Such a resource should provide
methods for eliciting participation from municipalities and aligning brownfield
redevelopment with community goals, metrics for prioritizing brownfields, and strategies
for leveraging subsidies to finance innovative reuses.
The Environmental Protection Agency has already contributed enormously to
resolving the technical and legal obstacles of brownfield redevelopment; its real task now
is to tackle the social and economic impediments to improving local environmental
quality. The agency should continue to support external initiatives such as the APA's
Community-Based Brownfields Redevelopment Strategies. The EPA must also
strengthen its internal brownfields program by attracting more staff with dual
proficiencies in the environmental sciences and planning or community development,
people who can help local governments revitalize people and places.
Conclusion
Without schemes for making brownfield redevelopment more relevant to the lay
population, participatory instruments will be little used. Brownfields must be imbued
with a more potent image than interstitial space and be captured in the collective
consciousness as images of resurrection and renewed prospects. Stories of promise are
not universal; what connotes prosperity and improvement for some spells displacement
and aggression for others. If brownfield redevelopment is not to become a new
incarnation of Urban Renewal, strategic efforts must be guided by the goals of the
plurality, refined through the exchange of ideas.
Localized inventories may best nurture the personal relationships needed to
extract and fairly test community knowledge, complementing institutional structures with
robust social networks. But not all cultures provide equal channels for local knowledge to
be transmitted or tested. Trust and bias will enable or frustrate the incorporation of local
knowledge, both in the ways it is pulled from social and organizational networks and the
ways it is assessed by those with power. The capacity of a brownfield inventory to
facilitate mutual learning among laypeople and professionals depends on the culture of
participation in the particular place in which it is undertaken. Participation may be
steeped in a local culture, or may be championed and enabled by individuals empowered
to facilitate it. Places where participation is demanded by citizenry and embraced by
authorities provide more fecund environments for long-lived, textured inventories. Where
participatory inventories persist through the efforts of individual champions their
continuation is more tenuous. Yet culture adapts, and the relationship between a
participatory inventory and the culture of a place is reciprocal. With investment in the
place-based social networks surrounding brownfields, an inventory may do more than
simply catalogue potentially-contaminated land; it may create common visions, fostering
respect, support and cooperation where none exists.
Appendix A: Interview Template
Tell me how the inventory project began.
Who sponsored your mapping project?
How were you involved in the inventory
project?
Who is the intended audience?
What sources did you use in creating your
brownfields mapping project?
Is the map web accessible? How did you
decide to make it web accessible?
Must property owners voluntarily
participate? If so, how did you decide to
make participation voluntary for property
owners?
I noticed that site nomination is part of the
process. Who can nominate sites?
How do you decide if a nominated site will
be incorporated into the inventory?
How many nominations would you say
you've received? How many of those make
it to the inventory level?
Are there mechanisms for the public to
suggest end uses or provide other
information beyond site identification? If
so, is that included in the inventory?
How do people find out about the
inventory? How did you elicit input?
If community organizations were involved:
Have you noticed overlap between sites
identified through regulatory lists and sites
identified by the community? What about
between community groups?
What was the nature of the community-
identified sites? How did they differ from
the regulatory lists?
How was community feedback filtered?
Did you have concerns about legitimacy?
How did you deal with conflicting
information?
Do you have any concerns about liability?
If so, how did you address those concerns?
How familiar were people with the concept
of brownfields? How did you orient them
to the concept?
Have you kept track of redevelopment on
properties listed on the inventory? How
many have been redeveloped, what uses,
how many received public funding, etc.?
Who else should I speak with?
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